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Judgment goes panoplied in awe,
Whether his brow be grim or mild.
Judgment is son to hallowed Law But Obiter still is Fancy's child.
By robe and office more than dust,
lit with strange fire that kindles clay,

Lawmen put forth the doom they must to bind tomorrow by today.
Who hews too close must miss the mark;
truth too much true is dying truth.

Obiter glows in gathering dark,
colors the clouds of doom with youth.'
Karl N. Llewellyn
*Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law; A.B., Georgetown; J.D., Harvard
Law School.
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INTRODUCTION: KINDLING CLAY-GATHERING DARK

Like its namesake,2 this article begins with bold assertions
that conventional legal thinking wears its failings too smugly, hews
its truth too closely, and sings its obiter too glibly. The argument
parallels Llewellyn's message in that it suggests the same fate for
realism that he prepared for doctrinal formalism - the methodology no longer accounts fully for the understanding of legal decisionmaking. However, the argument also offers homage by illustrating a substitute focus for legal reasoning that should increase
our understanding of the dominant jurisprudence beyond the existing combination of doctrinal formalism and institutional
realism.
Because the separation of powers structure of the Constitution
forces the judiciary to be conscious of the operation and limitations of its own institution, and because the intentionally openended architectural language of the document has historically invited formalistic interpretation, constitutional law provides a natural and perhaps logical setting for this investigation.' Specifically,
this essay critiques the public-private distinction in constitutional
law as defined primarily by Justice Rehnquist. The Supreme
Court's recent encounters with individual right claims in the federal courts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 document a movement in judgemade law aimed at producing and preserving a more local or state
oriented federalism than that pursued during the "Warren Court
Era."' While the present Court's direction may be obvious, the his2. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431
(1930)[hereinafter cited as Realistic Jurisprudence]; see also, Llewellyn, Some Realism
About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931).
3. The development of constitutional law and constitutional theory throughout
the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries tells a similar story of the discovery of indeterminacy through generalization ....
The doctrines of protected
constitutional interests and of legitimate ends of state action were the chief devices for defining the intrinsic legal-institutional structure of the scheme of ordered liberty.
Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 569 (1983).
4. See Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism,90 HARV. L. REV. 1133
(1977). For general reviews of the Burger Court's jurisprudence, see infra note 32. See also
Nowak, Forward:Evaluating the Work of the New LibertarianSupreme Court, 7 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 263 (1980); Frank, The Burger Court: The First Ten Years, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101 (1980); Gelfand, The Burger Court and the New Federalism:Preliminary
Reflections on the Roles of Local Government Actors in the PoliticalDramas of the 1980's,
21 B.C.L. REV. 763 (1980). For articles on Justice Rehnquist, see Powell, The Compleat
Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317 (1982); Shapiro, Mr.
Justice Rehnquist: A PreliminaryView, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1976); Tushnet, The Constitutional Right to One's Good Name: An Examination of the Scholarship of Mr. Justice
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torical and precedential coherence of the doctrines of article III
standing, equitable relief, state action, and due process in the fourteenth amendment, as fashioned in the elaboration of this recent
movement, seems problematic. The point is not to overthrow all
doctrines connected to the public-private distinction, but rather to
locate the source of legal confusion by offering a more comprehensive explanation of the Supreme Court's ongoing construction of
the constitutional politics of individual rights. In short, the point is
to uncover the meaning of the underlying image of "proper" legal
structure being established piece by interlocking piece. The new
public-private distinction structures constitutional interpretation
by implying that the necessity of conceptually separating public
and private choice reduces legal responsibility to a set of controversial premises about causation. But as the obiter of the publicprivate distinction becomes more sharply focused, individual rights
and subsidiary doctrines correspondingly become more hazy.
Such "criticism" assumes as given, as did Llewellyn's realism
in his time, the basically correct insights of a rich and growing
corpus of critical work by contemporaries whose methodologies are
loosely related. This body of work aims to destroy the legitimacy of
the current judicial binding of "tomorrow by today."' But, as with
Llewellyn's break with his contemporaries, to fully critique and
understand modern jurisprudence, we cannot escape the inevitability of moving forward through the present's "clouds of doom."'
Rehnquist, 64 Ky. L.J. 753 (1976).
5. In many ways, Roberto Mangabeira Unger's recent synthesis, The Critical Legal
Studies Movement, supra note 3, parallels Karl Llewellyn's articles. Unger describes the
connections within the group:
Two main tendencies can be distinguished in the critical legal studies movement.
One tendency sees past or contemporary doctrine as the expression of a particular vision of society while emphasizing the contradictory and manipulable character of doctrinal argument. Its immediate antecedents lie in antiformalist legal
theories and structuralist approaches to cultural history.
Another tendency
grows out of the social theories of Marx and Weber and the mode of social and
historical analysis that combines functionalist methods with radical aims. Its
point of departure has been the thesis that law and legal doctrine reflect, confirm, and reshape the social divisions and hierarchies inherent in a type of stage
of social organization such as "capitalism."
Id. at 563 n.1. A recent, although by no means exhaustive, review of this new critical legal
scholarship can be found in 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to
CriticalLegal Scholarship,95 HARv. L. REv. 1669 (1982)[hereinafter cited as Bramble Bush
Comment].
6. Both [tendencies of the critical legal studies movement] have yet to take a clear
position on the method, the content, and even the possibility of prescriptive and pragmatic
thought, perhaps because some of the assumptions inherited from the radical tradition
make it hard to turn constructive proposals into more than statements of commitment or
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Thus, the initial section of this essay compares the weaknesses
of realism's investigative focus 7 with an attempt by contemporary
legal scholars to seize the mantle of legal realism by demystifying
legal doctrine and legal history. The method employed in the remainder of the article identifies: (1) the mystification function of
the conceptual images that organize current legal doctrine with, (2)
an understanding of the inescapable meaning of such images for a
coherent, albeit contingent, perception of what counts as experience.8 Current legal doctrine may, in some sense, truncate discussion of the real social circumstances that give rise to a particular
dispute in order to lessen the social consequences of resolving that
dispute in a particular fashion. The very ability to recognize this
mystification depends on a defensible explanation of what relevant
meaning has been lost.9 Legal theory is always both misleading and
anticipations of history.
Unger, supra note 3, at 563 n.1.
7. Realists are interested in the relation of law and social behavior beyond analyzing
judicial dispute resolutions. It is perhaps a contribution to the prevalent mistake of contemporary treatments of realism to focus this article on the applicability of realist methodology
to appellate courts. However, while the evidence for this argument will be drawn from the
judicial setting, the reasoning process being examined applies at least to any particularly
legal decisionmaking and indeed, in the author's view, to thought itself. The problem of the
observer's lenses is familiar to any of the social science techniques available to the realists,
regardless of whether they observed social response to legal process or the decision process
itself. Strictly speaking, however, this article focuses on the necessary reliance upon culturally produced or dependent perceptual images for organizing and communicating factual
patterns of behavior as legitimated and natural - a process necessary to the adjudication of
disputes. I am indebted to William Twining for this clarification.
8. Obviously, some such epistemological premise is necessary for any explained alternative to given doctrines or institutions. Duncan Kennedy makes a similar claim - that legal
doctrine simultaneously functions as apology and utopian speculation. See Kennedy, The
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 205 (1979). Kennedy uses his
methodology to critically explicate Blackstone. This article makes the stronger normative
claim that such simultaneity is necessary for the integrity of understanding. The argument
is loosely Hegelian in that it assumes the unity (but not identity) of thought and reality and
thus, the unity of the ideal and the actual.
9. Patrick Gudridge, in a pathbreaking article entitled, The Persistence of Classical
Style, (forthcoming in Volume 131 of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) asks
whether such epistemological modeling is misguided by an aesthetic of classical value in
argumentative style. He may be right. His aim of extracting competing images of meaning
from within given styles of argument and complexes of legal media is compatible with this
essay's effort to break through the distinction between legal and other forms of discourse in
order to expand normative possibilities and their connection to actual social experience:
We may also come to believe that, in exposing the constructed character of the
work with which we disagree, we have somehow accomplished a great deal. We
do achieve something, I am sure: make explicit an authorial responsibility for
the images through which legal writing works itself out. This exposure, however,
may amount to no more than a kind of offense against decorum unless it is only
preliminarily a demonstration of artifice. Such a demonstration presupposes a
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necessary. 10
II.

HEWING Too CLOSE: REALISM Is TO FORMALISM

As X Is

TO

REALISM

Assumption: Realism as a method of legal reasoning in the resolution of legal disputes has been most clearly and accurately described by Karl Llewellyn. His piece A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step11 sufficiently argued its method. Initially,
two fundamental characteristics of this realism must be kept in
mind: (1) as a reform methodology, it was intended to shift the
focus and emphasis of explanatory scholarship from rules to contexts of interaction of official and lay (litigant) behavior while not
dismissing all the utility of formalism; and (2) it was a part of a
distinct period of philosophic movement towards pragmatism and
instrumentalism. Similarly, the argument of this section does not
deny realism, but shifts the focus of understanding case law to incorporate as tools of ideological image construction both formalism
and the institutional instrumentalism that realism has become.
Each of these prior conceptual frameworks is incomplete absent
such a legitimating device.
In the course of trying to understand judicial behavior and the
meaning of case law, Llewellyn primarily sought a more adequate
tool to explain and link the outcome of particular cases and the
decisionmaking process. Case law had ceased to be workable on its
own terms as a set of precedential rules deductively providing a
single correct outcome in every case. It seemed possible to reform
doctrine through the use of a more adequate reasoning tool while
simultaneously achieving greater clarity. For Llewellyn, whatever
else could be said to be the function of law, law established "mechmodeling of its own, and it should therefore properly serve as merely the introduction to a jurisprudence for which the variety of possible legal images is no
more than the given point of departure.
Gudridge, at _.
For Gudridge, the focus is on the act of description, not on its coherence or utility for

"understanding" the legal system. As an example, consider his critique of Kennedy's work
in the same article. This author obviously will appeal to coherence within institutional con-

texts as a style of reasoning, at least in the first instance, on the ground that the actors who
are examined here and their critics hold to classical values. Further claims about the relative
priority of metaphysics and epistemology in normative arguments must nervously await another manuscript.
10. A similar critical reargument of Bentham's work claims that "language is always
both misleading and necessary." Postema, Facts, Fiction and Law, in FACTS OF LAW (W.
Twining ed. 1982).
11. See Llewellyn, Realistic Jurisprudence, supra note 2.
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Thus, Llewellyn's target, formalism,

assumed that a correct and legitimate outcome in any given case
could be deduced from ever more generalized hierarchies of rules
of conduct. Formalism further assumed: (1) that any concept such
as a rule corresponded to discrete, distinguishable, and relatively
fixed and uncontroversially described realities; and (2) that such
concepts could be objectively defined and manipulated.
For Llewellyn, the first assumption was more basic and objectionable:18 the content problem with all of the nineteenth century
schools of jurisprudence, whether analytical, historical or philosophical, stemmed from a fixed conceptualization of either a logical
abstraction of precedent, customary notions of right, or categorical
ends as the starting point of reason."' The direct issue was not the
damage done by such thinking, but its unusefulness, indeed its unintelligibility. Llewellyn committed himself to pragmatism, both
ideologically and epistemologically:
For a concept, as I understand it, is built for a purpose. It is a
thinking tool. It is to make your data more manageable in doing
something, in getting somewhere with them . . . . And this
problem of the word [law] calling up wide-scattered and disparate references, according to the circumstance, seems to me
vital. 8
If the meaning of a concept depended on the context of its use, any
understanding of a rule would depend on the specific interactions
of rule-sayer and rule-hearer. Accordingly, realistic scholarship
should focus on actions as being a result of law, as well as for law,
rather than focus solely on the words of texts used in legal
decisionmaking.
A.

What the Bad Man Knew: The Realists' Remedy

The very evolution of rule formalism made the substance of a
rule subjective although it could be legitimate only if objective; but
12. Id. at 431.
13. Id. at 431-32.
14. This is traditional. When men talk or think about law, they talk and think about
rules. .

.

. Only a man partially caught in the traditional precept -

thinking of an age that

is passing would have focussed [sic] that behavior on, have given it a major reference to,
have belittled its importance by dealing with it as a phase of, those merely verbal formulae:
precepts.
Id. at 434.
15. Id. at 431-32 (emphasis in original). See Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
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this history merely exemplified the underlying epistemological
problem. According to Llewellyn, early English rules were tied to
common law forms of action and specific pleading as acknowledged, purely formalistic categories of remedies. "The question for
the man of that day took this shape: on what facts could one man
make use of any specific one of the specific ways of making the
court bother another man?" 16 Remedies evolved to such a complexity in pleading that their rationalization required finding purposes for the distinctions between forms of action. Rules became
required, after the fact, in order to protect rights holders. "They
could imagine these somethings and give them a name: rights, substantive rights. Thus the important, the substantial rules of law,
become rules defining rights. Remedies are relegated to the periphery of attention."17 But legal rights were not simply moral, and to
distinguish "eternal" rights from instrumental protections of rights
holders required focusing on the interests of those who could claim
enforcement of their rights: "Substantive rights themselves, like
remedies, exist only for a purpose. Their purpose is now perceived
to be the protection of the interests."' 8 Thus, it became possible to
see law as concerned solely with whether to enforce a right or
merely assure compensation for the breach of a rights holder's interests. These historical developments returned the focus of case
law to remedies, not in the original sense, but in a sense in which it
was impossible to see the actions of courts as being objective:
"Complete subjectivity has been achieved."' 9 Judicial actors were
intervening in the price of rights, or rather the price of impairment
of another's interests in the enforcement of rights.
Thus, rights and their rule-form were, as all concepts, of interest and understandable only in their use. Their use only coincidentally depended on the regularity of their words matching approximately fixed and similar activities. Therefore, a jurisprudence that
emphasizes the precedential restatement of words must do so for
its own ends. That jurisprudence thereby hides the true intent of
such restatement to insulate the ends from close examination:
"Right" adds nothing to descriptive power. But it gives a spe-

cious appearance of substance to prescriptive rules. They seem
to be about some thing ....

At the vital core of thought about

law, at the very place where one thought impinges on another, or
16.
17.
18.
19.

Llewellyn, Realistic Jurisprudence,supra note 2, at 436.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 441.
Id.
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where one part of law impinges on another, one sees the impingement in terms of idealized somethings which may not,
which mostly do not, reflect men's actions. In terms of words,
and not in terms of conduct; in terms of what apparently is understandable without checking up in life. So that one makes the
assumption - without the urge to inquiry - that one is dealing
with reality when he talks of rights, and proceeds to use these
unchecked words for further building.
* * *Having come to regard words as sound bases for further
thinking, the tendency is well nigh inevitable to simplify the formulations more and more ... doubly so because the word
"rights" introduces sub rosa at this point the additional notion
20
of "rightness" ..
To be sure, Llewellyn wished to reform the words of law in
order to reform the practices of law. But he had to first open up
the relevant legal discourse. The formalist discourse truncated examination of existing law in a specific way: by hiding its conservative ideology behind a false epistemology that treated words as
meaningful in and of themselves because of their correspondence
to specific events or real meanings in everyday life.2 ' Llewellyn observed that both everyday life and legal practices assumed that
words as actions could only have coherent meaning in their contextual usage, for "words, in a word, as the center of references or
thinking about law, is a block to clear thinking . ...
B.

X: Imaging Legitimacy

Can the realist's shift of focus to the purposive actions of legal
institutions be subjected to the same challenges of incoherence,
and the corresponding masking of meaning, in order to terminate
the investigation of alternative legal ideologies? Llewellyn seemed
to recognize this danger, as he backed away from addressing such a
possibility. When Llewellyn wished to compare "facts with facts,
20. Id. at 439-40.
21. Id. at 442.
22. Id.
Hence, whatever one thinks of the sufficiency in the large of the analysis in the
threefold terms of interests, substantive rights and rules, and remedies, one can
but pay homage to the sureness with which it forces law on the attention as
something man-made, something capable of criticism, of change, of reform-and
capable of criticism, change and reform not only according to standards found
inside law itself (inner harmony, logical consistence of rules, parts and tendencies, elegantia juris) but also according to standards vastly more vital found
outside law itself, in the society law purports both to govern and to serve.
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and not

. . .

words with words,"" he had to -

and did -

recog-

nize that: (1) facts do not come pre-classified, one from another,
(2) any classification by word descriptions will be contextual, (3)
words are facts (actions) as well as words, and (4) actions come in
part to be what they are represented to be.
Like rules, concepts are not to be eliminated; it cannot be
done. Behavior is too heterogeneous to be dealt with except after some artificial ordering. The sense impressions which make
up what we call observation are useless unless gathered into
some arrangement....
...[T]o classify is to disturb. It is to build emphases, to
create stresses, which obscure some of the data under observation and give fictitious value to others - a process which can be
excused only insofar as it is necessary to the accomplishing of a
purpose.2
Llewellyn's remedy was to be skeptical of such unavoidable
distortions, since "concepts, once formulated and once they have
entered into thought processes, tend to take on an appearance of
solidity, reality and inherent value which has no foundation in experience. '"" Thus, any conceptualization of facts will suffer the
same problem as rules, in terms of their potential for obscuring
alternatives. Yet escape from conceptualization is impossible.'0
Llewellyn's weakness was to assume that this recognition is a
sufficient advance over formalism. His focus on use suggests that
use can be recognized as instrumental without preconceptions as to
what counts as the instrument. "It is particularly troublesome in
regard to legal concepts, because of the tendency of the crystallized
legal concept to persist after the fact model from which the concept was once derived has disappeared or changed out of recognition.

'2 7

Llewellyn's skeptical narrowing of rule application to in-

creasingly specific factual'characteristics prevented the masking of
diversity through the use of abstractions; but it depended on the
abstraction of diversity itself. Diversity within the categories of in23. Id. at 446.
24. Id. at 453.
25. Id.

26. To be sure, these facts are many-sided and susceptible to being changed by
our view of them. As a result, the choice among views will always be contestable
and will always be influenced by normative precommitments. But these two
qualifications show the inconclusiveness of normative practice rather than its
arbitrariness.
Unger, supra note 3, at 652.
27. See Realistic Jurisprudence,supra note 2, at 453-54 (emphasis added).
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dividual behavior assumes to some degree that the proper pattern
of behavior is the existing pattern of pluralistic behavior. 2 Since
law is about mechanisms of social control,
[i]t is obvious that the set or attitude of those affected or sought
to be affected by any piece of "law" is at the heart of the problem of control; it should be equally obvious that the style of organization of those persons, their group ways of action whether among themselves or with regard to society at large is equally vital. Behavior effects depend upon present behavior
conditions. "
Thus, Llewellyn attacked formalism for hiding behind natural categories of meaning, and applauded the critical force of realism for
uncovering the purposive, human-created and not given, nature of
legal concepts, rules, and precedents. At the same time, Llewellyn
embraced social practice as having natural meaning, and failed to
see the purposive, human-created and artificial character of any
explanation of social practice itself.30 "Part of law, in many aspects, is all of society, and all of man in society. But that is a question of periphery and not of center .... ",1
Experience can be analytically labelled and represented as discrete relations of objects in time, regardless of their actual interconnections. Social relations both provide such experiential objects
of analysis and depend on learned patterns. Beyond the distortions
of grammar and the media of language, a particular constellation
of such represented relations prevails in any society. The necessary
experience of perceiving and consciously representing complex institutional contexts of actual societal conditions has its own impact
on the material aspects of those social conditions.3 2 Concept production becomes a material condition in a pre-information age.
Such a recognition is not just part of the situation sense of realism.
28. Id. at 446-47 n.12. As Llewellyn noted, "Equality of rule is impossible in a specialized society." Id. at 460 n.29.
29. Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
30. This is not to say that Llewellyn, among the early realists, was not the most sensitive to questions of meaning, or that Llewellyn's argument cannot be interpreted to account
for the acquisition of knowledge. Llewellyn did not focus on these issues. For a critical interpretation of Llewellyn and his arguments' relationship to the epistemology of Pragmatism,
see Casebeer, The Judging Glass, 33 U. MIAmI L. REV. 59 (1978); Casebeer, Escape from
Liberalism: Fact and Value in Karl Llewellyn, 1977 DUKE L.J. 671.
31. Llewellyn, Realistic Jurisprudence, supra note 2, at 465.
32. See generally, R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 147-50 (1975). "Instead, a
mentality achieves dominance because, among the many different sets of beliefs that compete for attention, it. becomes actualized in the main forms of social order." Id. at 149.
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Situation sense assumes that the natural historical progression of
social relations carries within the relation's very experience a discoverable working appropriateness that both distinguishes real differences of cognition in a social context and at least sets the terms
of the political struggle over the organizing of discrete relational
contexts. Image construction is not merely a meta-analysis or principle of situational thinking. Rather, image construction is the process of producing and explicating the experience of patterns of behavior by positing concepts that can represent a complex of
relations as if they were natural and not problematic. Such images
work in part because they are used.
Control over actual disputes or attempts to organize any set of
relationships as a discrete context appropriate for its own situation
sense depend on a conscious or subconscious embrace of certain
frameworks. These frameworks permit the labeling of fact, the
identification of the link between regularities of such facts and statistical norms, the explanation of the relationship between the
norm and the normative, and the simultaneous perception of all
this as fact itself dependent on human construction. The construction of social images thus generates potential political interest both
internal to the perceived content of any institution or person and
as part of an interaction of constructions in the representational
manifestations of any culture. An "image" is real because it is produced and functions in discourse; an "image" is artificial because it
represents, and simultaneously shapes, material social experience;
an "image" is constructed because of its political character in operation; an "image" is natural because it manifests what we actually
perceive and use to organize our facts and arguments. Indeed, in
this latter impact, situation sense is itself a constructed image.
Necessarily, image construction is simultaneously a tool and a
meaning of any process of legitimation - particularly law. 3
33. Despite a similarity of subject, this approach differs from Peter Gabel's essay, The
Mass Psychology of the New Federalism:How the Burger Court'sPolitical Imagery Legitimizes the Privatizationof Everyday Life, Paper at the Sixth Critical Legal Studies Conference, Harvard Law School (April 19, 1982)(on file at the University of Miami Law Review)[hereinafter cited as Gabel]. See also Blum, Cases That Shock the Conscience:
Reflections on Criticism of the Burger Court, 15 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 713 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Blum, Cases That Shock). Gabel argues that the Supreme Court is "funda-

mentally a figment of cultural imagination," its true role being the production of ideology as
a "set of cultural images which are intended to give a false political legitimacy to the social

order." Gabel, supra, at 2. Gabel's twin assumptions are: (1) that legitimacy is an outcome
capable of falsification, and (2) that such cultural images are autonomous, and perhaps unnecessary because they are such. These assumptions lead him astray, notbecause the images
are disfunctional in suggesting "proper" cultural relationships, but because those social rela-
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To fully understand the present doctrine, Llewellyn's periphery must become central - to see the construction of images of
social behavior in rule-manipulation and not simply in natural institutional interactions. Llewellyn recognized the stakes of subjugating facts to concepts. Perhaps for his own purposes he could not
see a more subtle mechanism of control - the subjugation of institutions to facts and facts to material conditions capable of the
same reification:
Hence the eternal fight for the control of the machinery of law,
and of law making, whereby the highly interested As can hope
partially to force their will upon the equally but adversely interested Bs and to put behind that control the passive approval
and support of the great body of Cs-who happen to be disinterested ....

8

By re-centering the meaning of legal phenomena as manifestations of social and societal behavior, the contemporary jurist
avoids a return to formalism, simultaneously describing and controlling the construction of an image of behavior which makes legal
institutions relevant. Construction is natural; in fact, it is inevitable."' Llewellyn could not recognize this logical entailment of his
own pragmatism because in a conceptualist methodology, rules rule
textual meaning rather than the reverse.
Not only ideals, but standards, not only standards, but concepts,
not only concepts, but rules, involve of course generalized
mental pictures which play a part in shaping both rules and the
actions of courts. But as traditionally dealt with, this ideal eletionships are not those of conscious consent in the first instance. The relationships themselves develop for contextual, cultural, and material reasons. The issue for any court is what
contribution to a given relationship's description and consciousness the court will attempt,
and how the court will phrase its contribution to their perceived meaning. If it were not the
court, it would be a different institution, perhaps one that is less vulnerable to scrutiny.
Under such circumstances, the label of falseness has its own mediation to sell, presumably
on the theory that unfalseness is akin to, though not as susceptible to attack as, truth.
The loss of critical power in Gabel's approach results from his assumptions that the
Supreme Court is a "figment," that its product is for other's consumption, and that such a
process is purely contingent upon the apology for material conditions and/or a utopian palliative for those conditions. This is a refusal to see the social process as a whole and a corresponding unwillingness to break free of an individualist, indeed liberalist, concept of the

production of meaning. See generally R.

UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS

(1975). Unger

seems to fear collapse to a new "idealism and elitism" in any attempt of transformative legal
politics. Unger, supra note 3, at 648. See also E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE
ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT

258-69 (1975).

34. Llewellyn, Realistic Jurisprudence,supra note 2, at 461.
35. See Casebeer, Escape from Liberalism: Fact and Value in Karl Llewellyn, supra
note 30, which discusses pragmatism's epistemology.
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ment, even where observed, is promptly related in the first instance to rules. 6
The immediate critical agenda must be to identify those generalized mental pictures that prevail as the legally approved soci-

ety;17 arguments over the positioning of the lens should be made
the focus of legal scholarship.38
36. Llewellyn, Realistic Jurisprudence,supra note 2, at 434 n.2.
37. Unger describes, in slightly different terms, this necessity for legal order and reasoning as "objectivism;" that is, "the belief that the authoritative legal materials-the system of statutes, cases, and accepted legal ideas-embody and sustain a defensible scheme of
human association." Unger, supra note 3, at 565. In part, this set of unexamined, supposedly descriptive, images of prevailing social powers and entitlements become the hidden
normative end, which provides the purposes for interpretating rules. Therefore, the claim
can be made that the politics of legislation is separable from more neutral rule-adjudication.
Professor Unger states: "Historical study has repeatedly shown that every attempt to find
the universal legal language of the democracy and the market revealed the falsehood of the
original idea. An increasing part of doctrinal analysis and legal theory has been devoted to
containing the subversive implications of this discovery." Id. at 568. He suggests that the
nature of legal reasoning requires both formalism, in order to legitimate its conclusions
without recourse to raw political power, and objectivism, in order to give content to artificial
reason. Id. at 564-67. Criticism should therefore seek to uncover: (1) factual disputes hidden
by techniques of language or methodology manipulation (both the realists' old attack on the
indeterminacy of rules and the more subtle, empty arguments over judicial activism or institutional competence); and (2) existing distributions of power that are maintained under the
assumption that conceptual descriptions of prevailing economic relationships are natural
and cannot be changed.
This essay primarily illustrates its critical argument by describing and attacking the
narrowing possibilities of freedom within the image of the public-private distinction. Thus,
it predominantly agrees with Unger's analysis of objectivism and its connection to the increasing reliance upon formal methods of legal argument to avoid the inherent politics of
legal reasoning. However, to the extent that the perceived source of the objectivism stems
from the need to give credence to distinctively legal reasoning, this essay parts company
with other critical legal studies. See, e.g., Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591, 669-73 (1981).
Professor Unger notes this ambiguous aim, and exhorts: "The existentialist thesis shows
in a leftism that exhausts itself in acts of frenzied destruction because it has no real alternative to put in place of the forms of governmental and economic order against which it rises."
Unger, supra note 3, at 661.
38. For a similar argument explaining successorship of the critical legal studies movement to the legal realists, see Bramble Bush Comment, supra note 5. While its conclusions
can generally be agreed upon, the comment exaggerates the inevitability and force of its own
argument by failing to understand the epistemology of the realist movement. That is, the
comment recognizes the pragmatism of Llewellyn's realism for political or reform purposes,
but fails to understand that his pragmatism is grounded as well in questions of meaning.
Thus, it is possible to equate the loose methodological similarities of critical legal studies
with the aims of the earlier equally loosely connected family of realists as simply a new wave
of law reformers. This partial insight neglects an important lesson for criticism that Llewellyn at least recognized, but did not adequately address.
The Bramble Bush Comment fundamentally mischaracterizes realism. The realists simply were not preoccupied with the language of decisions, except to belittle arguments about
language rather than arguments about the consequences of actions. Id. at 1672 n.18. See W.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:379

Image construction is the fundamental artifact, and thus the
precedential tool, of the politics of law in the form of adjudication
or legal interpretation. An image derives from individual judges'
ideologies; additionally, it contributes to the possibility of further
opinion formulation by the courts and to more widespread use of
case logic in the wider community. Yet the image as a manifestation of ideology functions as the vehicle for the written politics of
adjudication, a part of whose politics is the intent that the politics
take a written form.8 ' Written opinions are, in significant part,
written to be written and only in part written to be read.
For the internal political purposes of crafting a majority opinion, images are constructed to present or record a picture that, either in rough or in fine, will gain (or at least not scare off) a majority of votes (or at the trial court level, similarly attract the
attention of an appellate court). The image marks out a field that
organizes the advocates' picture of both the stakes of a dispute and
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MovEMENT (1973); Schlegel, American Legal

Realism and EmpiricalSocial Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BuFFALo L. REV. 459
(1979); Compare Bramble Bush Comment, supra note 5, at 1675, n.45 and accompanying
text on the U.C.C. with Realistic Jurisprudence,supra note 2, and K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 27 (1962). The Bramble Bush Comment's misemphasis is not important to the
main conclusions of the comment except as it undermines the comment's credibility. Nevertheless, the reason for the misreading is important.
The Bramble Bush Comment assumes that realism simply stopped short of turning
from action contexts to ideological structures rather than finding such issues beside the
point: "Oriented toward discrete doctrinal categories and linked to progressive law reform,
the Realist critique never turned its searching scrutiny to the entire structure of legal
thought nor to the ideological role of legal scholarship itself." Bramble Bush Comment,
supra note 5, at 1676.
These questions were peripheral for the realists. When the comment announces that
critical legal studies share "[R]ealists' twin orientations toward an iconoclastic historiography and a rigorous analytic jurisprudence," Bramble Bush Comment, supra note 5, at 1677,
it is correct only as far as that statement.
Realists and the criticism put forth in the Bramble Bush Comment must part to the
extent the criticism demands "[plositioning themselves outside the basic assumption of the
existing legal order. . . . Critical scholars seek, however, to characterize, not participate in,
the ways in which law contributes to the stabilization of a social world." Id. at 1681. If law is
about mechanisms of social control, it is not law or legitimacy, but control which is inescapable. Therefore, as a question of meaning, it is not an issue one can simply take out of
the realm of personal responsibility.
The Bramble Bush Comment ends, ironically, with the save naivete to which realism
ultimately succumbed. Just as Llewellyn could not see that facts served generalized mental
pictures which were not naturally understood, so the Bramble Bush Comment's version of
criticism suggests partisan advocacy, and student projects in participatory democracy as if
those actions did not commit one to defending the generalized mental pictures, thereby
suggesting the activity as something chosen rather than natural.
39. For a liberal analogue, see Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv.
L. REV. 353 (1978).
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its history, enables these word representations to be compared to
similar "fact patterns" of other retrievable disputes, sets a model
of abstraction towards which one may fashion a doctrinal rule, and
suggests that the exercise of institutional power to resolve the dispute has been natural and appropriate. Why? Because that is the
meaning of the dispute as it manifests itself in law.
At the same time an image possesses this substance, its production serves a political function because it must be constructed.
But the image is also constructed in a way that hides its artificial
character, thereby increasing its political force by limiting an investigation of either the image's meaning or its generation. Because
an image is not a rule, its fullness is only known over time and is
never known as the direct subject matter of a legal dispute. Each
legal conflict is only the occasion for an addition to the image's
manifestation in a written opinion. The meaning of image construction is thus in the continuous writing of it; its manifestations
are important to reach and simultaneously explain case outcomes.
Through these results, the idea or ideas in the image appear in
experiential analogies, which then serve as an external source for
further elaboration, application, and acceptance.
The written opinion, thus, simultaneously manifests itself inwardly by representing the politics of its joiners through individual
voices and a collective group. At the same time, the written opinion manifests itself outwardly through an image construction of legitimacy which immediately and ultimately resolves individual disputes and collectively facilitates, shapes, and encourages the
continued stable construction of a particular economic culture's
logic and meaning.
III.

FANCY'S CHILD: JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION As LEGAL POLITICS

The image of the public-private distinction grows clearer in
recent Supreme Court decisions, even as the distinction's contingent nature allows for aberration and fluctuation. This section will
concentrate on the coherence of the public-private idea as elaborated primarily in the opinions of its preeminent spokesman, Justice Rehnquist. But two caveats are necessary. First, the episodic
nature of legal image construction and the group dynamics of court
decisions mean that the resulting image will not always fit precisely (the better to do its work perhaps). Second, a more adequate
rationalization would result from a more thorough examination of
lower court experience, of the historical origins of the public-pri-
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vate distinction and empirical descriptions of the conditions that it
generalizes and captures, and of challenges to Rehnquist's construction from within the Court. This essay intends only to illustrate, as a rough sketch, the manifestation of the legal web of
meaning that is emerging from the public-private distinction. Key
cases will be juxtaposed as a nucleus from which other cases may
be viewed as emanating, much like the expanding ripples from a
pebble dropped in a pond.
In methodological terms, pursuing specific doctrines in precedential seriatim only provides an understanding of some of the
building materials of law with, by analogy, majority and dissent
arguing the merits of brick versus concrete. To continue the metaphor, the institutional role of the federal judiciary that emerges
splits the present court along ideological lines (pro-State, non-liability vs. pro-claimant) without any greater illumination than the
line drawing itself. 0 The worries of the present Court about the
institution of the federal judiciary interfering with state legislatures or local governmental functions corresponds to fights among
sub-contractors over pieces of the job. When a structure of liberty
is inevitably being built, it should be the architecture that is of
concern.
If a way out of this tangle exists, it will present itself in the
form of an image that enables judges to locate the source of their
institutional intractability, thereby providing the possibility for an
alternative image. 4' The image of the public-private distinction
seems an attractive candidate because of its felt necessity for interpreting the entire constitutional structure and, more generally, its
40. For the contemporary debate over the legitimacy of judicial review which assumes,
contrary to this essay, the separation of law and politics, see generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST

(1980); M.

PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

(1982);

L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978); Symposium: Judicial Review versus Democracy, 42 OHiO ST. L.J. 1 (1981); Symposium: Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 259 (1981); But see Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781 (1983);
Tushnet, Deviant Science in ConstitutionalLaw, 59 TEx. L. REv. 815 (1981).
41. Most legal traditions of the past incorporated the final level of legal argument
by relying upon a secular or sacred vision of the one right and necessary order of
social life. Modern legal doctrine, however, works in a social context in which
society has increasingly been forced open to transformative conflict. It exists in a
cultural context in which, to an unprecedented extent, society is understood to
be made and imagined rather than merely given. To incorporate the final level of
legal analysis in this new setting would be to transform legal doctrine into one
more arena for continuing the fight over the right and possible forms of social
life.
Unger, supra note 3, at 579.
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defining power as a premise that organizes data and phenomena in

the context of legal reasoning. 2
A.

43
Causation in Prototype Public Law: Rizzo v. Goode

The core of Justice Rehnquist's image of a social structure is
determined by the distribution of power between public and private actors. The image links the concepts of responsibility and authority and divorces both from the concept of power. Power is thus
a derivative, and not an originating, concept. Further, the image is
one of direct causation, which conceptually splits the exercise of
authority from its more indirect authorization and, thus, certainly
from permission or omission." This is necessary to ensure that the
42. See generally Casebeer, The Judging Glass, supra note 30.
43. 423 U.S. 362 (1976). One commentator has stated:
The case is a textbook example of public law litigation ....
• . . The pressure of this doctrinal environment, [reapportionment, desegregation, mental institution and prison reform] in large part beyond the power of
the Court to alter quickly, seems to me to be more than the anomalies of Rizzo
v. Goode can withstand over the long run.
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, at 1305,
1307 (1976).
44. See generally, Horwitz, The Doctrine of Objective Causation, in THE POLITICs OF
LAW 201 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
At the-conceptual center of all late-nineteenth century efforts to construct a system of private law free from the dangers of redistribution was the idea of objective causation. In tort law especially, where the dangers of social engineering had
long been feared, the idea of objective causation played a central role in preventing the infusion of "politics" into law.
Id. at 201. "'When a court says this damage is remote, it does not flow naturally, it is not
proximate,'. . . 'all they mean. . . is, that under the circumstances they think the plaintiff
should not recover."' Id. at 203 (quoting Green, Proximate and Remote Cause, 4 Am. L.
REv. 201 (1870). "When, in 1897, Holmes declared that in law 'the man of the future is the
man of statistics, the master of economics,' he already clearly understood the implications
that flowed from the radical change in the conception of responsibility that a prediction
theory entailed." Id. at 210 (quoting 0. HOLMES, THE PATH OF THE LAW 187 (1920)). See
also, Hovenkamp, Pragmatic Realism and Proximate Cause in America, 3 J. LEG. HIST. 3
(1982).
When Justice Rehnquist links "causation in fact" to "causes to be subjected," he defines causation in this nineteenth-century objective sense of "chain of events," "proximate
cause," and "scientific cause." The effect of doing so in the "public law" setting similarly
restrains courts from relegislating political structure and process. In contrast, for the breakdown and shift in theories of causation in the nineteenth century, see generally T. HASKELL,
THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISES OF AUTHORITY (1977). For an illustration of the
problematic and fictional reliance on causation to define the limits of power under the commerce clause in constitutional law, see United States v. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp., 76
F.2d 617, 624-25 (2d Cir. 1935) (Hand, J., concurring). The collapse of causation in private
law is documented in G.E. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1980).
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State4 5 is a purely formal concept that does not mediate disputes
over the distribution of power among State actors, or between such
actors and others." The State has no responsibility because legitimate authority depends on expectations of individuals as to the
limits of their causal relationship to each other, an intentional and
individualistic concept. Public power, therefore, consists of governmental actions of governmental employees. Public power can have
no definition dependent upon the undivided social group or the so47
cial interdependence of individuals.
Yet, because public and private power are sharply distinguished as a condition of defining private liberty, simultaneously,
the question of who is liable for the exercise of power is masked by
the arbitrary conceptualization of "causation," "State," "individual," and "power." Without linking these problematic conceptions
into an image splitting state and individual powers seemingly organized by the public-private distinction, the dependence of "private liberty" on this distinction would be seen as circular and
without force in organizing social phenomena and thereby mediating legal disputes. Therefore, the actual, but unexamined, organizing construction is the social distribution of responsibility for the
exercise of power over individual choice.4 " The remainder of this
argument explicates the false image of the public-private distinction in contemporary constitutional doctrine.
The blueprint for Justice Rehnquist's social image emerges
most explicitly in Rizzo v. Goode. 9 In Rizzo, a section 1983 action
Attempts to rehabilitate the concept in private law are found in H. HART & A. HONORE,
CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959); see also Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice: A Reply
to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 477 (1979). Under Epstein's four categories, Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), would probably be decided oppositely.
45. When capitalized, "State" refers to any sovereign entity. In federalism contexts, the

lower case "state" will be used.
46. That is not to say that a purely formalistic concept of State cannot be outcome-

producing in doctrine. See, for example, Justice Rehnquist's notion of State qua state in
National League of Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
47. Contrary to Blum, supra note 33, the public-private distinction does not "privatize"

disputes to reduce public protection of individuals; rather it individualizes all exercises of
corporate authority. The myth of the public-private distinction is thus the pretense that
private liberty is at risk from public power, rather than the notion that private liberty is at
risk from "public" support or acquiescence of the domination of some individual actors with

economic or political power. Public-private terminology masks the question of individual
legitimacy versus interdependence and social group as premises for analyzing the source and

limits of power.
48. The positive content lies beyond the scope of this essay's formulation of the construction of constitutional power.
49. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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alleged a "pervasive pattern of illegal and unconstitutional mistreatment by police officers . . . directed primarily against minority citizens in particular and against all Philadelphia residents in
general." 50 Ostensibly, the case raises a question of federalism:
whether "the judgment of the District Court represents an unwarranted intrusion by the federal judiciary into the discretionary authority committed to them by state and local law to perform their
official functions." 51 This appears to be the appropriate realist inquiry into the institutional purpose of, and corresponding limitation on, courts versus policymakers, and the appropriate role of
federal actors versus state actors. Section I of the opinion demonstrates, however, that these apparently functional categories, and
their accompanying legal boundary disputes, are purely formal distinctions because the institutional characteristics of the various actors do not organize the phenomenon of the dispute. 2 Thus, the
nub of the case explicitly relegates the content of such institutional
characteristics to derivation from the responsibility of specific actors to other individuals.
The findings of fact made by the District Court ... disclose a
central paradox which permeates that court's legal conclusions.
Individual police officers not named as parties to the action
were found to have violated the constitutional rights of particular individuals, only a few of whom were parties plaintiff. As the
facts developed, there was no affirmative link between the occurrence of the various incidents of police misconduct and the
adoption of any plan or policy by petitioners-express or otherwise-showing their authorization or approval of such misconduct. Instead, the sole causal connection found by the District
Court between petitioners and the individual respondents was
that in the absence of a change in police disciplinary procedures,
the incidents were likely to continue to occur, not with respect
to them, but as to the members of the classes they represented."
The assumptions of the paradox are:
1. The State does not owe a general responsibility to avoid the
50. Id. at 366-67.
51. Id. at 366.
52. Id. Professor Powell sees Rizzo simply as an assertive extension of Younger abstention, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), on grounds of federalism. He does not inquire into Justice Rehnquist's rationale for the extension, which discloses a much broader
normative vision than federalism and more correctly perceives Rizzo as a blueprint than an
extension of anything. See Powell, The Compleat Jeflersonian:Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, supra note 4.
53. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371.
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foreseeable consequences of loose disciplinary procedures unless
State actors have assumed specific responsibility or plotted a
conspiracy to ensure such consequences (State).
2. The individual actor can only be responsible for injuries
caused to other specific individuals (Causation).
3. Power consists of consequences directed toward specific individuals and not consequences which are permitted by an authority's existence (Power).
The majority's implicit institutional argument warned the federal courts not to readily find a "foundation for equitable intervention . . . because of an assertedly pervasive pattern of illegal and
unconstitutional mistreatment by police officers."5 4 Pervasive patterns of activity that, as a matter of prediction, only affect unidentified persons by direct causation require a remedy as systemic as
the pattern of behavior if they are to be subject to legal restraint.
Such a remedy will be in the form of a pervasive new policy that
might have been adopted by the political administration under
scrutiny but, for whatever reason, was not.55 Furthermore, it will
probably involve the remedying court in the ongoing supervision of
the program's administration. These are of course solid institutional concerns, but they are not the issues disclosed by the substance of the Rizzo opinion.50
Rather, the key to the "central paradox" is to translate these
problematic institutional limits of federal courts into a transformed understanding of state action that defines enforceable limits for the conduct of individuals who happen to be in public employ (and, therefore, subject to constitutional rights constraints
when they affect other individuals). 7 The central paradox is, in
fact, so central that it allows the Rizzo opinion to read like a shell
game in which any one of three holdings can be constructed individually or in combination:
1. the respondents lacked standing by failing to show a con54. Id. at 366.
55. See Realistic Jurisprudence,supra note 2, at 366.
56. Gelfand, supra note 4, 778-80. See infra note 71.
57. Justice Blackmun's vigorous dissent in Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 381-87, makes clear that
the pervasive nature of the remedy actually granted in this case does not require this transformation because: (1) it was negotiated between the parties as acceptable to the political
administration being challenged and (2) the remedy was predicated on a finding of fact of
direct individual responsibility for failure to supervise police activity with predictable consequences of specific injury. How these findings of fact can be found anew by the majority
raises another institutionalist question of the power of an appellate court. This question is
never addressed.
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crete injury directly caused by petitioners;
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not, as a substantive matter of law,
require public actors to avoid injuries directly caused by other
individuals simply because the injuries could have been prevented; and/or
3. constitutional equitable remedies should not supplant political discretion since the decisionmaker cannot be charged with
causing a direct injury that would limit the intervention of the
court in on-going administration to a specific scope.

This is especially the case in federal-court/state-administration contexts. The threshold question of who gets into court becomes the same question as how functionally do constitutional
rights of individuals limit the power of the Sovereign, which becomes the same question as what is appropriate equitable relief for
courts to grant against administration of government. This identity
holds only if legal disputes must be limited to a certain form, the
traditional common law adjudication of disputed individual interests-a specific person A specifically causes a specific injury to a
specific person B who requests a specific relief of the injury."8 Although the legal question presented in each subsection of section II
of the Rizzo opinion can be related to earlier doctrinal precedents,
Justice Rehnquist's particular vision forms the connection between
these questions as manifestations of the same central paradox. Yet
the connecting concepts are definitional rather than explanatory
58. This point is also noted in Goldstein, A Swann Song for Remedies: Equitable Relief
in the Burger Court, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 1, 3, 5, 16-18, 44 n.219, 55 (1978)[hereinafter cited as A Swann Song]. Goldstein, however, treats Rizzo as an indefensible doctrinal
aberration, i.e., an attempt to analyze public litigation as if it were a private lawsuit. This is
a result he documents to be at odds particularly with desegregation doctrines after Brown v.
Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The main point of Goldstein's argument is that in
public litigation, as distinguished from private litigation, relief must present different issues
than the scope of violation of the right. Therefore, he can only explain the outcome and its
central paradox as a less than clear deference to federalism. Taken on Rizzo's own terms,
however, this puzzlement seems planned. Compare the following explanations of the fiction
of proximate cause. "'In every instance before negligence can be predicated of a given act,
back of the act must be sought and found a duty to the individual complaining, the observance of which would have averted or avoided the injury.'" Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co.,
248 N.Y. 339, 342, 162 N.E. 99, 99-100 (1928)(quoting West Virginia Cent. & P. Ry. Co. v.
State, 96 Md. 652, 666, 54 A. 669, 671 (1903)). Now consider this explanation:
Citing two cases from 1850 and 1903 [Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903); Irwin
v. Dixon, 9 How. 10 (1850)] to the effect that injunctions against private parties
should be used sparingly and non-innovatively, Justice Rehnquist, for the Court,
stated that these strictures apply with special strength to suits directed at the
state, against which an injunction may issue only "in the most extraordinary
circumstances."
A Swann Song, supra, at 17-18 (1978)(citing Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 379).
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and, therefore, amplify the elusiveness of the precise holding. 9
More importantly, the return of constitutional adjudication to
the form of a late nineteenth century tort is accomplished via the
same notion of proximate cause or direct causation now long discredited in tort law itself, which enabled the judiciary to definitionally limit the negligence liability of concentrations of private
economic power. As Professor Hovenkamp notes succinctly, then
plaintiffs were "required to show not only that the defendant
'caused' the harm, but also that his action was an 'efficient' cause
and not merely a 'condition' under which the harm had occurred;
that this efficient cause led to the harm 'directly' and not 'indirectly'; and that this path was through a 'natural and continuous
sequence' of events and that no 'intervening cause' or 'superseding
cause' had broken this sequence." 60 For Hovenkamp, the comments of Professor Leon Green summarized one of the realist's red
flags, "the phraseology of causation lends itself to learned dissertation about any situation which the judges do not understand. It is
the last escape for judges who 'have made up their minds' but 'do
not know how.

. .

to articulate their conclusions on a rational ba-

sis.' "'I The purpose of examining causation as if it defined a natural distinction between the responsibilities of public versus private
actors exactly parallels the formalisms of proximate cause which in
judicial hands insulated the railroads or large corporations from
answering for the forseeable consequences of their admittedly dangerous acts and omissions. The point of image construction as a
framework or premise of either perception of facts or reasoning
from facts is that as a natural or metaphysical phenomenon it need
not be explained. Thus, the new proximate cause of state responsibility makes causation the central concept of each subsection of
Rizzo without ever transcending a tautology.
On the threshold question of standing, Justice Rehnquist "entertain[s] serious doubts whether on the facts as found there was
made out the requisite Art. III case or controversy between the
individually named respondents and petitioners." 62 These doubts
are overcome somehow because the district court "bridged the gap
59. See supra note 44.
60. Hovenkamp, supra note 44, at 10.

61. Id. at 22 (quoting L.

GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY

223 (1930)).

62. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371-72. "This hypothesis is even more attenuated than those
allegations of future injury found insufficient in O'Shea [v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974)] to

warrant invocation of federal jurisdiction ....
the pleadings." Id. at 372-73.

[U]nlike O'Shea, this case did not arise on
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between the facts shown at trial and the class-wide relief sought
with an unprecedented theory of § 1983 liability."" Yet when one
examines the facts relevant to the next subsection on potential liability, there seems to be no liability present because the petitioners
did not exercise direct responsibility for causing the injuries-in-fact
to the respondents." The opinion, therefore, boldly equates the
section 1983 language "subjects or causes to be subjected" with the
causation-in-fact standing requirement for an article III personal
injury without arguing the exclusivity of direct causation for the
responsibility of state actors to private citizens-in other words, on
section II A, see II B; on section II B, see II A."
The same manipulation occurs in section II C, which addresses
the issue of the appropriate scope of equitable relief. Justice Rehnquist states that "[g]oing beyond considerations concerning the existence of a live controversy and threshold statutory liability, we
must address an additional and novel claim advanced by respondent classes."66 If this language seems to rest the basis of Rizzo on
the scope of equitable relief that a district court can grant, such
suspicions are quickly dashed. First, the Supreme Court would
have a hard time revising the discretion of the trier of fact; however, the issue is never discussed. Second, by emphasizing that the
"nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy,

' 67

the

opinion refers back to the line of cases dealing with the issue of
standing to explain the nature of the violation.
In an astounding tour de force, Justice Rehnquist parallels
public law adjudication with private remedies. In a sense, therefore, he represents the modernist view that whatever courts institutionally do, in fact, is the substance of law. This view was previously identified by the realist's construction of the history of legal
institutions a la Llewellyn." The modernist's focus on the scope of
remedy demands caution, as a matter of separation of powers, because of its subjectively defined interference with representative
democratic institutions. However, Rehnquist goes one step further
than the realists by identifying the modernist's focus with proper
allegations of justiciable injury as a prerequisite for redress by an
63. Id. at 373.
64. Id. at 375-76.
65. "In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Court said that § 1983 'should be read
against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural conse' Id. at 384.
quences of his actions .
66. Id. at 377.
67. Id. at 378 (quoting Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1970)).
68. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
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article III court.69 Thus, by making the pleading of direct personal
injury a precondition to judicial relief, he links the modern interest
in the remedy with the early English interest in remedy based on
common law pleading.70 The public-private distinction does not,
therefore, depend on institutional issues of court power per se, because the forms of law with respect to public and private claims
are made identical to and dependent upon a particular image of
power that is related to the exercise of choice by individuals. The
consequence is legal liability defined as the risk of court-imposed
costs of injunction. The tort-feasor or government official decides
whether to risk such consequences as the legal penalty of decision.
This approach flanks neatly a quite different assumption
about the difference between public and private legal claims, resulting in another image of the public-private distinction. Such an
image is premised on a modernist concern for remedy that does
center on courts as institutions of government. This second tradition argues that the public law remedy cannot simply set the price
for violations of law because what is at stake is not only individual
rights, but also the legitimacy of political institutions and
processes, although discounted by the costs of court supervision of
injunctive restructuring of government as well. For such concerns,
the constraints of federalism become real, if nonetheless conceptually hard, issues that are not simply derivative of individualized
71
responsibility.
B.

The Central Paradox: Standing, Right, Relief

While Justice Rehnquist's discussion in Rizzo of the concerns
of federalism as additional limits on federal court intervention in
local government service administration is compatible with the
earlier linkage of the doctrines of standing, section 1983, and the
69. The Court today, in an opinion that purports to be a "standing" opinion but

that actually, I believe, has overtones of outmoded notions of pleading and of
justiciability, refuses to find that any of the variously situated plaintiffs can

clear numerous hurdles, some constructed here for the first time, necessary to
establish "standing." ... [I]n fact the opinion can be explained only by an indefensible hostility to the claim on the merits.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 520 (1975)(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan went on
to comment: "To require them to allege such facts is to require them to prove their case on
paper in order to get into court at all, reverting to the form of fact pleading long abjured in

the federal courts." Id. at 528.
70. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
71. See generally Chayes, Forward-PublicLaw Litigation and the Burger Court, 96
HAv. L. REv. 4 (1982).
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scope of equity, it adds nothing to the individual force of these
doctrines. To see how each link in the chain fits together requires
elaboration on Justice Rehnquist's understanding of Warth v. Seldin7 2 in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and States his position on due process in
Paul v. Davis,7 4 and finally, his articulation of the scope of relief
72. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). Valley Forge represents Justice Rehnquist's version of the
standing doctrine as expressed in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91
(1979), Simon v. Eastern Ky, Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976), and Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975). His interpretatio of the standing doctrine represents a movement
away from the position of the Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
73. 454 U.S. 464 (1982). In Valley Forge, an organization dedicated to the separation of
church and state challenged the conveyance of federal property to a church-related college
on the ground that the conveyance violated the establishment clause of the first amendment. The organization alleged that each of its members "'would be deprived of the fair
and constitutional use of his (her) tax dollar . . . .'" Id. at 469 (quoting App. at 36).
Justice Brennan, in dissent, recognized that the "palpable injury" and "causal connection" requirements for standing are not terms of "unvarying meaning." Id. at 492. Justice
Rehnquist, the dissent charges, obscured the notion of federally protected rights "by
wrenching snippets of language" from previous standing cases. Id. at 510. The dissent argues that "the Constitution, and by legislation the Congress, may impart a new, and on
occasion unique, meaning to the terms 'injury' and 'causation' in particular statutory or
constitutional contexts." Id. at 492. For example, in Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,
617 n.3 (1973), the Court stated: "Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the
invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute."
Justice Brennan in Valley Forge explained that the framers of the Constitution, in erecting
an architecture of positive law, exercised their power to create legal rights, "the invasion of
which creates standing." 454 U.S. at 492 n.2 (quoting Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614, 617 n.3 (1973)). Moreover, Justice Brennan quoted Justice Frankfurter for the proposition that "[a] litigant ordinarily has standing to challenge a governmental action of a sort
that, if taken by a private person, would create a right of action cognizable by the courts."
Id. at 492 n.3 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152
(1951)(concurring opinion)(citations omitted)). This line of reasoning indicates a recognition
that the notion of right does not require a singular understanding of causation.
74. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Justice Rehnquist's opinion clearly illustrates the "central paradox" found in Rizzo. In Paul, Justice Rehnquist once again invoked his image of social
structure, i.e., the public-private distinction, divorcing state power from state responsibility.
Justice Rehnquist began his opinion by observing that if the respondent's allegations
had been made against a private party rather than against police officers, "he would have
nothing more than a claim for defamation under state law." Id. at 698. He then voiced his
concern that holding police officials accountable for their activities under a section 1983
claim "would seem almost necessarily to result in every legally cognizable [state inflicted]
injury.. . establishing a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 699.
In reaching his conclusion, Justice Rehnquist explained that defamation alone does not
implicate a constitutionally protected liberty interest. He reasoned:
[S]ince it is surely far more clear from the language of the Fourteenth Amendment that "life" is protected against state deprivation than it is that reputation
is protected against state injury, it would be difficult to see why the survivors of
an innocent bystander mistakenly shot by a policeman or negligently killed by a
sheriff driving a government vehicle, would not have claims equally cognizable
under § 1983.
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available in a federal court in PasadenaCity Board of Education
7

v. Spangler. 5
Id. at 698.
He therefore narrowed the scope of constitutional protection to those interests that
"have been initially recognized and protected by state law," id. at 710 (footnote omitted),
and then only if state conduct "officially remov[ed] the interest from the recognition and
protection previously afforded by the State." Id. at 711. For an excellent analysis of the
issues involved in damage relief under section 1983, see Whitman, ConstitutionalTorts, 79
MICH. L. REv. 5, 30-40 (1980). See also the compatible development of Justice Powell's majority opinion in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
Justice Powell's opinion in Ingraham is guided by Justice Rehnquist's image of the
public-private distinction. The Ingraham Court found that a public school student's freedom from deliberate infliction of physical pain by school officials is within the liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. The Court, however, held that due process was
satisfied by the state's preservation of common-law and statutory restrictions against unreasonable punishment and by the availability of state criminal and tort remedies for excessive
corporal punishment. See Rosenberg, Ingraham v. Wright: The Supreme Court's Whipping
Boy, 78 COLUM. L. Rav. 75 (1978). The case, more importantly, leaves state actors subject
only to state law in state tribunals. The notion of state responsibility is thus obfuscated, as
federally protected interests give way to Justice Rehnquist's "central paradox": the translation of institutional limits on federal courts into limits on the conduct of individuals, who
happen to be state officials, affecting other individuals. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976).
75. 427 U.S. 424 (1976). In Spangler, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, limited a district court's continued jurisdiction to supervise its desegregation order. The Court
held that where a school board had initially complied with a district court's segregation
order specifying that no school have a "majority of any minority students," 311 F. Supp.
501, 505 (1970), the district court exceeded its authority by enforcing its order so as to
require an annual readjustment of attendance zones to meet demographic shifts. Using the
dicta in Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), the Court observed that the Constitution does not require a "particular degree of racial balance," 427 U.S. at 434 (quoting
Swann, 402 U.S. at 24), and thus, "'[a]bsent a constitutional violation there would be no
basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a racial basis.'" Id. (quoting Swann,
402 U.S. at 28). Conceding that the Pasadena School Board might not have achieved a unitary system as mandated by Swann because of the board's failure to comply fully with court
ordered procedures regarding staff hiring and promoting, id. at 436, Justice Rehnquist nevertheless found that "the District Court had fully performed its function of providing the
appropriate remedy," id. at 437, by having "implemented a racially neutral attendance pattern." Id. at 436-37.
Justice Rehnquist again limits individual rights by restricting a district court's ability
to fashion an appropriate remedy. See generally Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). In
Spangler, he noted that de jure segregation had been remedied, and that the alleged constitutional violation merely "resulted from people randomly moving into, out of, and around"
the school district. 427 U.S. at 435-36. Consequently, Justice Rehnquist concluded, the
school board could not be charged with causing an injury. He thus limited the scope of
continuing judicial intervention into the school board's on-going administration.
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, however, recognized that "there is no question as to there being both a 'right and a violation'" and that the constitutional "violation
had not yet been entirely remedied" (as Justice Rehnquist had conceded). Id. at 444. Thus,
"'[o]nce a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable
powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable
remedies.'" Id. at 443 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 15). Justice Rehnquist, nevertheless,
limited the district court's equitable powers to a single occasion, checking the court's au-
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In Valley Forge, Justice Rehnquist transforms the "double
nexus" test of Flast v. Cohen7 6 into an article III minimum requirement. The Flast test demands that the taxpayer challenge
only exercises of congressional power to tax and spend and that
the particular enactment exceed a constitutional limit directed
specifically at the taxing and spending power. In Warth v. Seldin,
to meet the threshold of article III, the party who invokes the
court's authority must show that he personally has suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant and that the injury fairly can be traced to
the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision. When Justice Rehnquist applies this direct causation-infact requirement to define an appropriate taxpayer injury-in-fact,
he is requiring a particular kind of connection between the taxing/
spending decision and the kind of injury that justifies review.
Notice first, the Warth causation-in-fact test codified in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood formally tracks the three
supposedly separate sections of Rizzo-injury, substance of claim,
limits of relief." Second, by constitutionalizing the double nexus
test, the alleged cause of the plaintiff's injury must be a specific
governmental act of spending that violates a specific spending duty
to protect taxpayers. This notion of causation is impossible to reconcile with the "but for causation" found to satisfy the Warth
standard in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Study Group.75 Nonetheless, Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Valley Forge invokes Duke
Power in footnote nine.
Justice Rehnquist explains that the public-private distinction
requires this transformation:
Were the federal courts merely publicly funded forums for the
ventilation of public grievances or the refinement of jurisprudential understanding, the concept of "standing" would be quite
unnecessary ....

The exercise of judicial power, which can so

profoundly affect the lives, liberty, and property of those to
thority to supervise the removal of all vestiges of unconstitutional discrimination. Swann,
402 U.S. at 32.
76. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). In Flast, the Court stated that the required nexus between the
taxpayer and the claim sought to be adjudicated is established only if the challenged measure (1) was enacted under Congress' taxing and spending powers-thus affecting all taxpayers, and (2) is challenged as exceeding some specific limitation on the taxing and spending powers-thus affecting the constitutional rights of the taxpayer before the court. Id. at
102-03.
77. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979).
78. 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:379

whom it extends, is therefore restricted to litigants who can
show "injury in fact" resulting from the action which they seek
to have the court adjudicate."'
Thus, the primacy of politics for public choice, and adjudication
for private or personal rights, can only be preserved by asserting a
bright line rule of causation. However, as the public-private distinction grows sharper, the doctrine of standing becomes proportionately unclear.8 0
At the other end of the central paradox a similar unclarity has
been created in the doctrinal development of the equitable remedy.
This results from a sharp distinction between those injuries that
can be traced to an unconstitutional act of an identifiable government official and those injuries that might be traced to private reactions to judicially ordered, but time consuming, relief from past
constitutional violations permitted by the original officials and
their successors. In Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler,e1 Justice Rehnquist used this causation based distinction because of the need to preserve the public-private distinction, and
stated, "[T]hese limits are in part tied to the necessity of establishing that school authorities have in some manner caused unconstitutional segregation, for '[a]bsent a constitutional violation there
would be no basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on
a racial basis'."8 2 Such a view assumes, however, that private housing choices are irrelevant to the school board's decisions incorporating residence patterns into educational resource allocations,
both before and after findings of constitutional violation. This is
an assumption difficult in both facts and law. 84
5 an earlier Court expressly
In Green v. County School Board,8
79. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473.

80. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist substantiates Justice Brennan's accusation of a disguised
return to code pleading: "[T]he constitutional power of federal courts cannot be defined,
and indeed has no substance, without reference to the necessity 'to adjudge the legal rights
of litigants in actual controversies.' Liverpool S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113
U.S. 33, 39 (1885)." 454 U.S. at 471. In Liverpool, an action of indebitatus assumpsit could
not be heard because a plea in bar of a Congressional act may or may not apply (depending
on its constitutional validity) because the facts alleged may, but do not necessarily, describe
a cause of action protected by the Congress. Compare and contrast with Duke Power, 438
U.S. at 72.

81. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
82. Id. at 434 (citations omitted).

83. See Dayton Bd.of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd.of Educ.
v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).

84. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
85. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In 1965, after a suit was filed for injunctive relief against main-
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recognized the difficulty in deciding to treat the relationship between the scope of the remedy and the underlying violation of
right as connected and constrained but not coextensive, as Justice
Rehnquist would have it. In the Green Court's review of freedom
of choice plans, equitable relief shifted from purifying the decisional process to achievement of results that demonstrated elimination of the segregative impact of the past violation, albeit on the
theory that this was the only actual means of believing the decisional process had been purified of segregative intent.
In his dissent in Columbus School Board v. Penick," Justice
Rehnquist followed the central paradox of Rizzo by connecting the
substantive, invidious discriminatory intent standard of equal protection to the scope of permissible relief.
Like causation analysis, the discriminatory-purpose requirement
sensibly seeks to limit court intervention to the rectification of
conditions that offend the Constitution-stigma and other harm
inflicted by racially motivated governmental action-and prevent unwarranted encroachment on the autonomy of local govwhich could well result from a
ernment and private individuals
87
less structured approach.

Then in joining Justice Powell's dissent in the most recent at-large
election system case, Rogers v. Herman Lodge,88 the State's intent
is tied to identifiable officials:
The Mobile plurality also affirmed that the concept of "intent"
was no mere fiction, and held that the District Court had erred
in "its failure to identify the state officials whose intent it considered relevant."' 9
This intent of state actors, however, must remain as metaphysical as the nineteenth century notion of proximate cause to
ensure no public liability for forseeable private reactions. The majority is discredited because, "Federal Courts thus are invited to
tenance of allegedly segregated schools, the Board, in order to remain eligible for federal
financial aid, adopted a "freedom-of-choice" plan for' desegregating its schools. The plan
permitted students, except those entering the first and eighth grades, to choose annually
between the schools; those not choosing were assigned to the school previously attended.
First and eighth graders were required to affirmatively choose a school.
86. 443 U.S. 449, 489 (1979). °
87. Id. at 509. See also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 542 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
88. 102 S.Ct. 3272 (1982).
89. Id. at 3281 (Powell, J., dissenting)(quoting Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 n.20
(1980)).
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engage in deeply subjective inquiries into the motivations of local
officials in structuring local governments[;J . . . 'objective' factors
should be the focus of inquiry in vote dilution cases."9 0 The following conundrum results: relief must be aimed at and limited to the
"objective" intent of specific, subjective individuals employed by
the public.
Justice Rehnquist connects intent with scope of permissible
relief because his image of a public-private distinction prevents
courts, as well as administrators who fear court-imposed constitutional responsibilities, from affecting private choice in the relief of
past public wrongs: "In a school system with racially imbalanced
schools, every school board action regarding construction, pupil assignment, transportation, annexation and temporary facilities will
promote integration, aggravate segregation or maintain segregation."9 1 He maintains this image despite the recognition that, as a
principle of causation that governs the determination of both violation and scope of relief, some proven violations and their effects
will go unrelieved: "Virtually every urban area in this country has
racially and ethnically identifiable neighborhoods, doubtless resulting from a melange of past happenings prompted by economic considerations, private discrimination, discriminatory school assignments, or a desire to reside near people of one's own race or ethnic
background." 9
As recognized by the court in Green, the effects of rights violations by established patterns and practices of governmental behavior over a course of time can never be wiped out instantly, or even
quickly. Therefore, a strict causation test in remedy doctrine will
virtually never assure a correction of the decisional process. Yet
the very notion of equitable relief suggests that the task of the decisional process is to correct the unconstitutional condition by balancing individual and collective interests; again, the result is a
sharper image but a fuzzier doctrine.
C.

Paradox Deluxe: City of Los Angeles v. Lyons

An opinion authored by Justice White in the current term of
the Supreme Court provides startling confirmation that the federalism concerns of Rizzo v. Goode are simply derivative of a much
more radical restriction of judicial business outlined in the reason90. Id. at 3282, 3283.
91. Columbus School Bd., 443 U.S. at 510.

92. Id. at 512.

19831

CRITICAL JURISPRUDENCE

ing of causation concepts. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons9 3 the
Supreme Court held that under Rizzo a pleading of personal injury
sufficient to meet article III requirements for standing in a damage
action for past injury may nonetheless fail to plead facts sufficient
to allow standing to request injunctive relief. Adolph Lyons's choking by a policeman during a traffic stop for a faulty taillight would
permit damage relief against the city for an official policy authorizing force of its agents beyond constitutional limits. But the allegation of such an unconstitutional policy did not sufficiently connect
Lyons's past injury to risk of future harm to him to constitute personal injury of the kind necessary to distinguish Lyons from any
person within Los Angeles. Lyons had to allege in his pleadings not
only that "he would have another encounter with the police but
also to make the incredible assertion either, 1) that all police officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they
happen to have an encounter . . . or, 2) that the City ordered or
authorized police officers to act in such manner. ' 94 Justice White
thought that "[n]o extension of O'Shea and Rizzo is necessary to
hold that respondent Lyons has failed to demonstrate a case or
controversy with the City that would justify the equitable relief
sought.""8
The implications are astounding. First, Justice White confirms
the Rizzo shell game. Whereas Justice Rehnquist overcame serious
doubts about justiciability to discuss the merits of a section 1983
claim and the merits of equitable relief, Justice White treats Rizzo
as resting on justiciability, specifically extending O'Shea v. Littleton.9" He even continues the transformation of Flast v. Cohen
from a prudential limit on taxpayer actions to the generic test for
minimum article III cases and controversies begun in Valley Forge.
It is the principal citation for this proposition. 97 That Rizzo was
about standing and causation, and not federalism, could not be
clearer.
Second, for Justice White no extension of Rizzo is necessary
despite the fact that in Rizzo the plaintiffs alleged responsibility
on the basis of failure of superiors to control a pattern and practice
of police behavior, while in Lyons the plaintiff alleged a stated and
written policy authorizing discretion in the use of specific force. A
93. 103 S.Ct. 1660 (1983).
94. Id. at 1667.
95. Id. at 1667 (footnote omitted).
96. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
97. Lyons, 103 S.Ct. at 1665.
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city still does not cause legally cognizable injury even if a specific
person or body acts in an unconstitutional manner as long as the
action is not directed at a specific person.
Third, and most astonishingly, this notion of causation gauges
the appropriateness of parties according to the type of relief requested. The question becomes whether the "complaint states a
sound basis for equitable relief."'9 8 A person may, assuming her allegations true for justiciability, properly seek damages because a
specific person (or policy) caused injury to her specifically in the
past. However, she is not sufficiently adverse in interest to request
considerationof alternative relief to prevent re-injury because virtually anyone might be the target of the assumed unconstitutional
action already the predicate for the damage action. There will not
even be judicial consideration that injunctive relief might be necessary to make whole a possibly inadequate damage remedy. Equitable relief no longer serves as alternative relief.9 9 It must be pled
as its own cause of action. The return to code pleading is complete. 10 0 And the basis for the maneuver is once again the Rizzo
shell game. Justice White noted that an alternative holding of
Rizzo was that the lack of a deliberate policy on behalf of the
named defendants did not provide a basis for equitable relief. In
fact, this becomes an alternative holding of Lyons as well. There is
no showing of "a likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury," 10 ' despite the difference that, to Justice Marshall's
consternation in dissent, Rizzo resolved its doubts about justiciability in order to reach the remedy question while Lyons does
not. ' The pea in the shell game is made visible.
Fourth, the merging of specificity of relief into the threshold
of justiciability must be pled' 03 and decided before trial, unlike
98. Id. at 1666.
99. The inadequacy of damage relief potentially affects the instant case. Because of the
timing of the appeal, Lyons's damage action remained to be determined under law, including possible defenses of sovereign immunity or good faith official conduct immunities of all
the named actors.
100. For comment on the unworkable nature of this return to fact pleading and the
history of the change, see Roberts, Fact Pleading,Notice Pleading and Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 390, 430 n.225 (1980)(on causation and remediability).
For the change in legal process from code pleading to notice pleading, see Chayes, supra
note 43, at 1283, 1289, 1290 (including discussion related to C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 1 (2d ed. 1947)).
101. Lyons, 103 S.Ct. at 1670 (quoting O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 502).
102. Id. at 1677 n.17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1677 n.7.
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Gladstone, Realtors.10 " Rather than basing the extent of a remedy
upon proof of a violation, code pleading requires that the relief request be framed so that the injunction prayed for does not affect
situations broader than those offered for proof of offense. Therefore, code pleading fundamentally screens the cause of action
rather than pleads notice of a legal claim. The result is a distortion
of the purpose of the post-1937 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 05 Because Lyons purports to rest on the requirements of article III cases or controversies, presumably Congress cannot return
constitutional actions to the form of notice pleading. Making the
relationship between the scope of the relief and the breadth of the
violation a part of the pleadings, so as to distinguish standing for
damages from standing for injunction, is the step Rizzo left
implicit.' 0 6
In limiting the public policy process, courts may only consider
the arguments of persons who have suffered a specific injury as a
result of a specific policy or decision aimed at producing such an
injury because absent such a relationship what the defendant
"caused" cannot easily define the exact stakes for each party in
advance of the litigation. Therefore, the doctrinal standards to determine when the plaintiff has suffered some "threatened or actual
injury resulting from the putative illegal action" (Warth) translate
into the need to demonstrate that the "injury" caused by the defendant is an injury because it is within the zone of legal interests
protected by the substantive legal claim (Valley Forge). Such demonstration is intended to ensure that the injury will be redressed
by judicial judgment. Thus, the justiciability standard becomes
conceptually interchangeable with the prerequisite for equitable
relief-that the requesting party demonstrate a likelihood of substantial and irreparable injury requiring an injunction (Lyons) by
virtue of the same definition of "injury." Legal injury results from
specific substantive legal duties caused to be harmed by action di104. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
105. For an analysis of the confusion involved in moving a substantive examination of
cause of action under standing into jurisdictional motions to dismiss, see Garvey, A Litigation Primer for Standing Dismissals, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 545 (1980).
106. "I am aware of no case decided since the abolition of the old common law forms of
action, and the Court cites none, that in any way supports this crabbed construction of the

complaint. A federal court is capable of concluding for itself that two plus two equals four."
Lyons, 103 S.Ct. at 1675 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

"The Court's decision turns these well accepted principles on their heads by requiring a
separate standing inquiry with respect to each request for relief. Until now, questions concerning remedy were relevant to the threshold issue of standing only in the limited sense
that some relief must be possible." Id. at 1680 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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rected at the complainant. Since the standards for who gets into
court become conceptually interchangeable with what a person
properly in court can request, both standards become questions of
rightful individual expectations of other individuals' conduct.
The result of Rizzo's causation analysis is now clean and open:
The Court's decision removes an entire class of constitutional
violations from the equitable powers of a federal court. It immunizes from prospective equitable relief any policy that authorizes
persistent deprivations of constitutional rights as long as no individual can establish with substantial certainty that he will be
injured, or injured again, in the future .... The federal judicial

power is now limited to levying a toll for such a systematic constitutional violation.107
How high the tariff depends, of course, on the scope of immunities provided for the State actor's good faith. As Llewellyn foresaw, the remedy circle closes; modern subjective humanity wants
its judges to set the legal price of its desires, not legally reform or
constrain their individualistic passions."0 '
D.

The Empty State's Actions: Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks

In Rizzo, Justice Rehnquist individualized the legal conceptualization of power by limiting legal concern to the intentional application of power to other individuals who complain of the application's consequences. Any questions pertaining to the limits,
creation, or legitimacy of the source of the generic power that the
challenged actor asserts (for example, the discretionary supervision
of police conduct), therefore, are not cognizable. Individualization
limits potential liability to consequences that can be proven to be
the intentional fault of specific administrators. Thus, individualization of the form of legal disputes, and not the "privatization"' 10 9
107. Id. at 1683-84.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
109. Identifying the new federalism as privatization of social choice reverses the actual

direction of the logic of the public-private distinction. Privatization of law does not reduce
the sphere of the accountable public within such doctrines as fourteenth amendment state
action. Instead, constructing institutions or patterns of social practice as voluntary private
associations inevitably leads to the political support of private social hierarchies which, in
turn, increases the protection of both public and private powerholders. The intensification
of the public-private distinction emphasizes the private in order to change and rehabilitate
the public. Both the public and the private, as concepts, are necessary to the content of each
other and to their combined usage as a device for organizing meaning. To look for instrumental outcomes as direct consequences of decisionmaking is to fail to advance beyond realism; to lack an understanding of the instrument or the mode of the Supreme Court's signifi-
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of those disputes, becomes the mechanism of masking responsibility for injuries suffered at the hands of the State but not performed by identifiable state actors.11
Such a distribution of power in society, effectuated by legal
definitions, however, can only be seen as solely a matter of application if the creation or legitimation of power relationships is given
and natural, and not constructed as a matter of politics (and,
therefore, problematic). Yet the state-action doctrine in constitutional law seems to assume both premises simultaneously."' It
would be ironic (and perhaps absurd) to suggest that a woman
seeking to prevent a warehouseman's proposed sale of her stored
possessions, as permitted by section 7-210 of the Uniform Commercial Code, sue the New York legislature rather than the warehouseman."' Even though the U.C.C. could hardly be said to be, in
all its particulars, innate to the nature of humanity, legislators are
the only individuals involved in creating or causing the legal
scheme. Responsibility for the consequences of public power
should not cease merely because those injured by its exercise cannot find a state actor triggerman in a situation where the public
power organizes a pattern of acceptable social relations. Yet the
role of the Constitution in limiting public power can never be realized if a "private" actor attempting to enforce his own interests
through an exercise of the public power is responsible only for an
unauthorized usurpation of such power. This is precisely the result,
however, of combining individualization of power with the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment. In Flagg Brothers,
Inc. v. Brooks, nothing about the maneuver is hidden. Justice Stevens ends his dissent with the following challenge:
cant actual effects. But see Gabel, supra note 33, at 10, 11; Blum, supra note 33, at 745.
110. Rizzo, on its facts, does not fit the model put forth in Blum, supra note 33. What
is at stake is the reaching of State responsibility avoided by individualizing state actor liability. This responsibility cannot be put into the potential liability of state actors pursuant
to ultra vires principles for injuring a private individual.
111. As this article was in final stages of editing, the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review published a symposium on the Public-Private Distinction. 130 U. PA. L. Rav. 1289
(1982). Particularly, the article by Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote
on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296 (1982), parallels this subject matter.
Some of the argument here is anticipated or shared for other purposes by Professor Brest.
However, Professor Brest's explanation of the role of state powers in protection and facilitation of property uses and of the incompleteness of doctrinal justification within Flagg
Brothers is more thoroughly explored. Yet, Professor Brest does not extensively relate state
action to other embodiments of the public-private distinction made clearer in the 1982 state
action trilogy or recent justiciability opinions.
112. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
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The power to order legally binding surrenders of property and
the constitutional restrictions on that power are necessary correlatives in our system. In effect, today's decision allows the State
to divorce these two elements by the simple expedient of transferring the implementation of its policy to private parties. Because the Fourteenth Amendment does not countenance such a
division of power and responsibility, I respectfully dissent."' 3
The section 1983 action in Flagg Brothers raises the question
of who has the doctrinal constitutional responsibility to protect the
plaintiff's procedural due process rights as a component of the substantive content of the fourteenth amendment's state action requirement, as opposed to using such questions to screen potentially liable actors under a threshold question like justiciability:
A claim ... under § 1983 must embody at least two elements.
Respondents are first bound to show that they have been deprived of a right "secured by the Constitution and the laws" of
the United States. They must secondly show that Flagg Brothers deprived them of this right acting "under color of any statute" of the State of New York. 14
Although the Flagg Brothers plaintiff demonstrated that the warehouseman's authorization to sell her goods for nonpayment of a
disputed bill stemmed from the U.C.C. in New York, she could not
identify a "secured" right by a showing that the injury was properly attributable to the State of New York.
The Court's factual description of the case in Flagg Brothers
is virtually indistinguishable from the fact pattern described in
Rizzo:
It must be noted that respondents have named no public
officials as defendants in this action ....
This total absence of
overt official involvement plainly distinguishes this case from
earlier decisions imposing procedural restrictions on creditor's
remedies such as North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
113

Because no specific governmental actor directly contributed to the
specific action of the warehouseman, by either delegating an exclusively sovereign function ordering the choice leading to the plaintiff's deprivation, or specifically approving the action taken as pol113. Id. at 178-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 155.
115. Id. at 157 (citations omitted).

19831

CRITICAL JURISPRUDENCE

icy, no state action was present. The warehouseman's self-help was
simply permitted by the background rules of public order available
to all private decisions. The sharp line drawn between public and
private power prevents a private individual from using constitutional rights to interfere with other private individuals' state-permitted choices. Such intereference, if allowed, would be a seemingly perverse use of court protections of the boundaries of public
power. By limiting liability to direct causation, the individualization of public responsibility allows the creation of a sharp conceptual division of public and private power through the doctrine of
state action.1 1 But it does more, not surprisingly; beyond doctrinal
symmetry, both Rizzo and Flagg Brothers evidence an identical
understanding of federal courts as limited institutions.
The fact that conduct is private does not insulate it from government control; the fourteenth amendment shields it only from
federal court review. Such conduct will be supervised, if so desired,
by state or local legislative majorities in the name of the public
good. If in Rizzo, the question of who is an appropriate party to
trigger judicial review becomes equivalent to the question of what
remedies can be applied to actors challenged by those plaintiffs,
then both questions are collapsed into the state action inquiry of
what private actors must submit to judicial review of constitutionally imposed responsibility for the exercise of public power. In
both cases, given the premise of direct causation evidenced by
Rizzo and Flagg Brothers, the State is not responsible for individual choices; it simply limits the scope of responsibility to that of
individual governmental actors.
Dividing the public and the private power into spheres defined
by individualizing the actors involved necessarily forces property
to become the creature of positive legislation. 1 ' Because the allo116. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1147-74 (1978). But see Flagg Bros.,

Inc. v. Brooks:
But it is no longer possible, if it ever was, to believe that a sharp line can be
drawn between private and public actions.
See, e.g., Thompson, Piercing the Veil of State Action: The Revisionist Theory
and a Mythical Application to Self-Help Repossession, 1977 Wis. L. Rev. 1;
Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State
Action" Requirement, 1976 S.Ct. Rev. 221; Black, Foreword: "State Action,"
Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69 (1967);
Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 Texas L. Rev. 347 (1963); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 3 (1961).
436 U.S. 149, 178 & n.16 (1978)(Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Brest, supra note 111 at
1311-14; Nerken, infra note 130.
117. "[Pjroperty interest is not a monolithic, abstract concept hovering in the legal
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cation of resources is inherently a product of legislative permission,
there cannot be any causal responsibility of the public for the
choices of resource use by individuals, if any individual choices are
to remain private. Paradoxically, just as in Rizzo, the "State"
ceases to have any conceptual interest independent of an aggregation of its officials. As Justice Marshall noted in dissent in Flagg
Brothers:
[T]he Court approaches the question before us as if it can be
decided without reference to the role that the State has always
played in lien execution by forced sale. In so doing, the Court
treats the State as if it were, to use the Court's words, "a monolithic, abstract concept hovering in the legal stratosphere."'' 8
The institutional restraint exercised by the Court in Rizzo and
Flagg Brothers subjects liberty as well as property notions to legislative control. Justice Brennan complains angrily in his dissent in
Paul v. Davis that without procedural due process review, a local
police chief should not post the name and picture of a person as an
"active shoplifter" where charges have never been adjudicated because "[t]he essential element of this type of § 1983 action is abuse
of his official position." 9 Yet Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion views the case as an action between two individuals. 12 0 Such
individual wrongs are private relations to be governed by state law:
"The words 'liberty' and 'property' as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment do not in terms single out reputation as a candidate
for special protection over and above other interests that may be
protected by state law. 1 21 Only if the wrong adversely affects a
governmental status or eligibility requirement will procedural due
process come into play. 12 Hence, misuse of position or limits on
public arbitrariness are not important. Only if a governmental
promise is attacked in a direct, intentional way by a governmental
stratosphere. It is a bundle of rights in personalty, the metes and bounds of which are determined by the decisional and statutory law of the State of New York." Flagg Bros., 436 U.S.

at 160 n.10.
118. Id. at 168.
119. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 717 (1976)(Brennan, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted).
120. "Respondent's construction would seem almost necessarily to result in every legally cognizable injury which may have been inflicted by a state official acting under 'color

of law' establishing a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 699.
121. Id. at 701.
122. Contra Powell, supra note 4, at 1332. The conceptual distinction in Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), makes sense if we view that case as involving a specific
state-created expectation that is being intentionally destroyed by a specific state actor. This
action, which is admittedly arbitrary, although not tortious, fits Rehnquist's vision of federal
court review of consequences caused by a state actor.
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actor will federal courts possess institutional power to exercise review. This result has far-reaching consequences for federalism; but
the nature and scope of these consequences derive from a causation principle premised on a particular image of the public and private powers of individual actors.12
The paradox of individualized powers in Flagg Brothers gutted the concept of State to the actions of officials employed by the
State in order to prevent the fourteenth amendment from reaching
the conduct of private individuals dependent on public recognition, acquiescence or allocation of resources. Earlier, Rizzo and
Warth prepared the path to Flagg Brothers by limiting the judicially cognizable wrong to forms of action resembling common-law
tort. Now, in Paul, the triumph of the paradox prevents a procedural due process objection to action officially labeling a person
criminal without ever conducting a trial precisely because a specific
sheriff has posted a public notice that names a specific individual,
since the wrong fits the form of a state law libel action. To the
extent a constitutional wrong is properly pled, it is probably not
within the substantive protection of a constitutional right. When
the State is empty of responsibility as a state, only the intentional
acts of its officials can be subjected to review of their actions' consequences to others. The fourteenth amendment applies to fewer
persons. The fourteenth amendment applies to fewer consequences
of fewer person's actions.
E. Paradox Lost: The 1982 Section 1983 Trilogy
This image is so powerful that it leads to spectacularly irreconcilable outcomes on the facts of the cases, but to easy applications of the state-action doctrine, in the section 1983 trilogy of the
1981-82 term.
123. Strictly speaking, it is possible for negligent acts to provide the predicate for a
section 1983 cause of action. However, the remedy for such acts is provided under state tort

law and thus is not a right secured by the fourteenth amendment. Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527 (1981)(Rehnquist, J., majority opinion).

"The loss of property, although attributable to the State as action under 'color of law,'
is in almost all cases beyond the control of the State. Indeed, in most cases it is not only
impracticable, but impossible, to provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation." Id.

at 541.
Thus, post deprivation tort remedies constitute adequate due process, contingent upon
the state's position to control the negligence or damage to property. This control, however,
cannot be the same as permission or authorization either internal to government, see Rizzo,
423 U.S. at 362, or external to the actions of governmental actors, see Flagg Bros., 436 U.S.
at 149; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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First, compare' the factual contexts of Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn," 4 and Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.125 In Rendell-Baker, the

Court avoided procedural due process review of the firing of a private school employee by finding that the school was a private actor
for purposes of its discharge decision, even though: (a) nearly all of
the school's students were referred to it by the public schools; (b)
because they could not be educated in the public schools due to
drug, alcohol, or behavorial problems; (c) the public school board
issued certified diplomas to the school's graduates; (d) the public
school board, by contract, controlled the curriculum of each student referred by it to the school; (e) public funds accounted for 9099% of the school's operating budget; (f) Rendell-Baker's position
was funded by a locally administered federal grant; (g) the state
administering agency had the right of approval of the school's hiring decisions. In spite of these connections of the public and private institutions, the Court characterized the dismissal of RendellBaker as a private action because no public official specifically ordered, affirmed or otherwise
caused the specific private administra1 26
tor to fire the employee.

In contrast, in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., a private supplier
sued its distributor on a debt under state law and sought a prejudgment attachment, which was executed by the county sheriff.
The Court held that the debtor was permitted to sue the private
supplier directly under section 1983 because of overt, official involvement by the state in a property deprivation-Fuentes" 7 with
a vengeance.
The correctness of either outcome is not important. The most
public of functions, -privately organized, can be insulated by the
public itself from constitutional responsibility, while the most private economic relationship between an ongoing supplier and a retailer becomes subject to a section 1983 suit as a result of simple
contract enforcement. Yet, perhaps proving that wrong results
make bad law, in Rendell-Baker the focus on actors confuses the
place of state action in substantive law while, and in part because
of, skewing the factual perception of the case. The transformation
124. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
125. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
126. "The limited role played by the Massachusetts Committee on Criminal Justice in
the discharge of Rendell-Baker is not comparable tD the role played by the public officials in
Adickes and Lugar." Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 839 n.6.
127. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). In Fuentes, the issue involved a state
law that provided for the issuance of writs ordering state agents to seize a person's possessions without notice or opportunity for a hearing.
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of state action from other exercises of power for which the State is
responsible to causes attributable to intentional decisions of officials, inevitably elicits the wrong doctrinal focus. The proper question-to whom does the fourteenth amendment apply?-elicits a
test for the presence of state action that is 180 degrees from its
function of explaining who risks federal court jurisdiction to enforce due process interests of other citizens. Chief Justice Burger
finds:
[A] State normally can be held responsible for a private decision
only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such
significant encouragement, either overt or covert, 28that the choice
must in law be deemed to be that of the State.
Surely, the issue in Rendell-Baker must be whether federal courts
should force a private school, of this relation to a public school
district, to provide notice and some kind of hearing before discharging its teachers. Similarly, the issue in Lugar must be
whether an oil supplier should be liable for damages for seeking
preservation of property subject to legal proceedings. Should such
persons be responsible to respect constitutional limits to the exercise of power affecting other citizens? No notion of federalism or of
the power of courts within separation of powers can rationalize the
results in these cases. Yet given a particular image of public versus
private power, the results are necessary. In Lugar, all members of
the Court can locate the historical source of this image in the Civil

1 29
Rights Cases:

"In 1883, this court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, .
affirmed the essential dichotomy set forth in [the Fourteenth]
Amendment between deprivation by the State, subject to scrutiny under its provisions, and private conduct, 'however discriminatory or wrongful,' against which the Fourteenth Amendment
128. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840 (Burger, C.J., quoting Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 911, 1004 (1982)). In dissent in Lugar, Chief Justice

Burger, the author of Duke Power, curiously finds fault with the majority's reliance on a
"dubious but-for analysis" to conclude that, but for the dependence of attachment, enforcement of the legal rights of the actor would not transform his or her acts into those subject to
the fourteenth amendment. Yet, the injury complained of here would be removed if the
supplier could be proven to have deprived plaintiff of an owed due process right in precisely
the same way that the environmental plaintiffs would be relieved in Duke Power if allowed
to meet the quite different doctrinal prerequisite of justiciability for judicial relief. Of
course, standing differs from state action, but the intellectual work performed by causation
principles in both doctrines is the same and the two functions themselves are linked in
Rizzo.
129. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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offers no shield." Careful adherence to the "state action" requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting
the reach of federal law and federal judicial power. It also avoids
imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for
conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed. . . .Whether
this is good or bad policy, it is a fundamental fact of our political order. " '
The question arises as to how this "fundamental fact" will
manifest itself doctrinally, The Court answers with a two-pronged
test that encompasses the current variety of state action articulations and combines individualization of power and direct causation
principles of individual relationships.
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some
right or privilege created by the state or by a rule of conduct
imposed by the state or by a person for whom the state is responsible .... Second, the party charged with the deprivation
must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor."" 1
In Lugar, the supplier acted together with the sheriff to directly control the debtor's assets. In Rendell-Baker, the criteria for
firing were not imposed by a governmental official, nor was there
significant state aid in the specific decision to administer the criteria. Finally, no governmental official directly caused the dismissal.
The fact that there would have been no institution, or any dispute
within it, without the public function upon which the school depended was irrelevant.
Yet how fundamental is this "fact" of the public-private dichotomy to the present Court? After all, the problematic need or
possibility of separating public and private power created an image
that to Justice Bradley looked "fundamentally" different from the
way it appeared to Justices White or Rehnquist. For Justice Bradley, in the Civil Rights Cases, the individual invasion of individual
rights was not the subject of the fourteenth amendment; but if the
state failed to redress private wrongs that to Bradley were not
their option to ignore, Congress could enact legislation counteracting this defect of state power by acting directly against the state
130. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936-37 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 349 (1974)). For a strong critique of the precedential and theoretical validity of this
fundamentality, see Nerken, A New Deal for the Protection of Fourteenth Amendment
Rights: Challenging the DoctrinalBases of the Civil Rights Cases and State Action Theory,

12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv.297 (1977).
131. Id. at 937 (emphasis added).
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itself.13 2 For Justice Bradley, the sharp line between public and
private power did not depend on direct causation in its definition
of legal responsibility for the exercise of power because it did not
depend on power as defined by individuals. Justice Bradley's fundamental facts concerned power and not officials. When those conceptions of power were undermined by legislative reactions (under
the commerce clause) to the growing interdependence of market
relationships in a national economy,'33 utilization of the police
power to substitute collective contracts for individual contracts,
and redistribution of property entitlements,3 " the response to Justice Bradley's notion could have been a new image of power rather
than powers. Instead, a new image of public versus private powers
has been recast to account for individual interaction. To avoid collapse into the market's seamless web necessitates an artificial principle of limitation for those acts caused by private individuals as
opposed to those acts caused by public officials. The market's dependency on public authorization-a necessary premise of the new
commerce clause and minimum rationality due process-must in
turn be denied in order to separate power from its source. This
contradiction demands, and yet hides behind, a view of causation
artificially limited to direct consequences of specific acts-the image that Justice Rehnquist constructed in Rizzo, Flagg Brothers
and Paul v. Davis.
The coherence of the image breaks down not at the doctrinal
or institutional level, but at the level of fundamental social fact or
conception, a necessary aspect of adjudicated law as recognized in
Lugar. Before beginning reconstruction, the coherence of the present construction forces closer examination of Flagg Brothers.
A fixed line separating the spheres of public and private power
would seem "real," "objective," and "natural" in the era of dual
sovereignty federalism.' In the period between the Civil War and
the Depression, the question of to whom rights applied was the
same as the question of what choices, individual or public, belonged to which sphere of power. In the famous footnote 10 of
Flagg Brothers, Justice Rehnquist recognized that the fixity of the
boundary of public power has been destroyed as a natural phenom132. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24-25.
133. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
134. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
135. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897).
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enon independent of, or prior to, legislation:
[Tjhat property interest is not a monolithic, abstract concept
hovering in the legal stratosphere. It is a bundle of rights in personalty, the metes and bounds of which are determined by the
decisional and statutory law of the State of New York. The validity of the property interest in these possessions which respondents previously acquired from some other private person depends on New York law, and the manner in which that same
property interest in these same possessions may be lost or transferred to still another private person likewise depends on New
York law.'
Justice Rehnquist did not seem to realize that, by definition,
the same rigid boundary of private power protected by individual
rights had also been destroyed. He simply concludes:
It would intolerably broaden . . . the notion of state action

under the Fourteenth Amendment to hold that the mere existence of a body of property law in a State, whether decisional or
statutory, itself amounted to "state action" even though no state
process or state
officials were ever involved in enforcing that
1 7
body of law.

To Justice Bradley, it was not only tolerable but obvious that innkeepers, who ran public houses under a duty of nondiscrimination,
and railroads were public. For Justice Bradley, "state action" did
not need to refer to public power rather than actions of the State.
Therefore, Congress could direct the states to live up to their affirmative public responsibilities. When modern notions of property
cease to be characterized as public or private by virtue of their
natural uses or functions, public (State) action must be "state action." But to nakedly assert that there continues to be a sharp line
separating public action and private action simply demonstrates
the total formality or emptiness of the concept of the State or Sovereign' 88 in Justice Rehnquist's images. Additionally, such an assertion uses an incoherent doctrine to hide a necessarily unstable
sphere of private right protected by the Constitution. Charitably,
the deception simply promotes the primacy of state legislative policy over liberty. At a minimum, the deception masks classist pro136. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 160 n.10.

137. Id.
138. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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tection of capital including warehouses," 9 private utilities,1" 0 private drinking clubs," 1 private hospitals and private schools.
IV.

OBITER STILL: THE REUNION OF POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY

IN THE PUBLIC PART OF PRIVATE ACTS

A more adequate construction of state action would dispense
with the image of the public-private distinction to reunite the legal
concepts of power and responsibility.
To rewrite constitutional history in this essay would be as futile as it would be tiresome. What may be suggested, however, is
how an image of public power can contain within it individual autonomy, a tension that gives rise to an understanding and preservation of liberty. Surely, that is the true issue of the fourteenth
amendment. It is also the true issue when determining to which
private parties the amendment
may be applied within the require14 2
action.
state
of
ment
What must be avoided conceptually is a language trick that
substitutes a new set of labels for "public" and "private" in the
public-private distinction-a rose by any other name.14 3 A reinvention of a "community-autonomy" distinction would recreate the
same misleading images susceptible to Justice Rehnquist's manipulation, even though they might also supply a vessel for a different
political direction. The desired goal is to construct an image that
requires notions of the public to incorporate autonomy in the generation of what counts as public. Private choice, therefore, would
1 44
have no conceptual meaning as the opposition of public choice.
Thus, it would be impossible to restrict the definition of public responsibility to intentional consequences of specific actors. Instead
of constructing an image of social relations whose meaning was exhausted by the consequences of the actor's actions whether public
or private, it would be necessary to begin image construction by
139. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 149.
140. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
141. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
142. See L. TRIBE, supra note 116, at 1150, 1158, 1167.
143. See Unger, supra note 3, at 575.

144. This enterprise must not be confused with images in which "[c]onservative social
thought places society prior to individuals by developing the implications of the idea that
we can understand what we think and do only with reference to the social matrix within

which we find ourselves." Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,98 HARV. L. Rzv.781, 785 (1983). While such an assumption

may be epistemically required, it does not follow that all notions of individual autonomy are
lexically secondary to community in a consistent political-legal theory.
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centering on power and its exercise-an image more important if
the object of conceptualization is creating legal responsibility for
respecting liberty.
A.

The Past's Shadow: Responsibility in Shelley v. Kraemer

The legitimation of power, rather than actors, is not so foreign, even to the images that previously interpreted the public-private distinction. In fact, the traditional public-private distinction
as evidence in cases such as Shelley v. Kraemer,'45 Reitman v.
Mulkey,' 4 New York Times v. Sullivan, 47 and Justice Marshall's
dissent in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,' 4 s still merits citation in court opinions, even as the new public-private image of direct causation undermines the prior meaning of state action. As
the new public-private distinction develops increasing coherence
by restraining federal power of adjudication and limiting the doctrinal content of constitutional rights, the ability to explain the
correctness of Shelley, Reitman, and Sullivan diminishes. However, once a different image of public power and responsibility develops from an alternative premise of the group context of individual relationships, these decisions seem a natural consequence.
Moreover, this new image appears to be an acceptable starting
point to accomplish the tasks of the present construc49
tion-explaining the legitimacy of legal interpretation.1
Granted, the legal legitimation of some exercises of power, and
not others, may be necessary to ensure social order and stability.
Such an atmosphere of order may be necessary to protect and permit the opportunity for personal choice. Definition, restriction,
145. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
146. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
147. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
We hold that the rule of law applied by the Alabama courts is constitutionally
deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the
press that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.
Id. at 264-65. See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 456 U.S. 958 (1982).

148. Jackson, 419 U.S. 345, 365-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have
applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions
on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that

law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only, though
supplemented by statute. .

.

. The test is not the form in which state power has

been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been
exercised.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964) (citation omitted).
149. See, e.g., Radin, Property and Personhood,34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 1008-15 (1982).
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and/or subsidization of interpersonal and corporate relationships
may also be useful in expanding the capacity for individual choice.
The configuration of legal structures undeniably affects actual
choices and, thus, the ability to perceive individual identity. Furthermore, the choices such legal structures permit may be labeled
private if made by non-governmental officials. Yet given the nature
of the legal structures and the choices they allow, there is no need
to equate freedom, particularly self-identity, with the opportunities permitted by a non-governmental actor. 5 0 But this is the assumption inherent in the image of liberty within Justice Rehnquist's public-private distinction. Equivalently logical, and
therefore coherent, constitutional images can begin with liberty as
self-identity within a myriad of private and public interlocking
corporate relations. 5 1
The question thus becomes not whether individual desire
must yield to public good and regulation, but under what circumstances will such individual submission demand some constitutional constraint involving a responsible governmental answering
for its compelling reasons and employing least restrictive alternatives. That is, under what circumstances does the surrender of personal will to control, or power enforced by legal structures, require
enforceable responsibility against those actors who benefit from legal incorporation of their will into the collective definition of social
order? Justice Marshall in Jackson suggested two such
circumstances:
[When] the State's involvement suggests state approval of the
objectionable conduct. [W]hen the activity in question is of such
public importance that the State invariably either provides the
service itself or permits private companies to act as state surrogates in providing it ....
In those cases, the State has deter150. See Brest, supra note 111, at 1317-22.
151. Isaiah Berlin points out that negative theories are concerned with the area in
which the subject should be left without interference, whereas the positive doctrines are concerned with who or what controls. I should like to put the point
behind this in a slightly different way. Doctrines of positive freedom are concerned with a view of freedom which involves essentially the exercising of control over one's life. On this view, one is free only to the 'extent that one has
effectively determined oneself and the shape of one's life. The concept of freedom here is an exercise-concept.
By contrast, negative theories can rely simply on an opportunity-concept,

where being free is a matter of what we can do, of what it is open to us to do,
whether or not we do anything to exercise these options.
Taylor, What's Wrong with Negative Liberty, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM 175, 177 (A. Ryan
ed. 1979). See also Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 149.
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mined that if private companies wish to enter the field, they will
have to surrender many of the prerogatives normally associated
with private enterprise and behave in many ways like a governmental body .... 152
The objectionable aspect of Reitman, Shelley, and Sullivan,
therefore, lies not in a state's legislature repealing an amendment
traceable in a direct line of causation from the voters to private
housing discrimination, or from state judges to private discrimination, or from state judges to censorship. The evil lies in an inexplicable legal structure, which at one and the same time claims
neutrality because no government actor can be causally traced to
the complained of injury and would not have existed were it unnecessary to provide state legitimacy for a particular ordering of
competing individual wills.
The state action in Shelley subjects the third-party actor to
the sales contract and the racial covenantor to fourteenth amendment restriction. This restraint exists not because a judge, as a
governmental actor, must have supported private racial discrimination. Rather, it is because judicial enforcement of the covenant
evidences a preference to enforce the prior-in-time contract, barring the subsequent sales contract, thereby remaining consistent
with public policy. 158 The legal structure thus approves an image of
liberty in which racially discriminatory contracts are sanctioned.
Such a status is more than a mere opportunity for self-realization,
even though no governmental actor caused a specific consequential
act. What is important about the act is not that a private or a
public person did it. Rather, the act is significant because there is
sufficient collective responsibility for its effect on an individual's
ability to define a personal identity absent racial coercion, such
that an alternative holding would significantly impair the ability to
distinguish conceptually between public responsibility and its absence-between a public policy distributing coercive power to subsidize some particular individual desires and a publicly permitted
capacity to realize an independent identity, recognizing that all
such choices depend on public provision of order.
152. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 369-70, 372 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

153. In these cases, the state courts' enforcement of the restrictive agreements was directed pursuant to their own common law policy as formulated by those courts in earlier
decisions. 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
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B.

The Ideologies of Liberty as Public Legitimacy

The need to interpret architectural language in light of legal
disputes over constitutional protection necessarily possesses this
dialectical quality. This process of interpretation is constitutive of
law. Since law expresses legitimacy in social order, the very understanding of the dispute and its stakes reflects assumptions manifested in the web of custom, practice, and social relations by which
society appears to both the disputants and decisionmaker. In turn,
the meaning attributed to the legal language in question influences
these assumptions. This was explicitly understood in Reitman v.
Mulkey in the majority's answer to Justice Harlan's dissenting assertion that proposition fourteen was simply a repeal of a past
open-housing law, indicating the public's new policy of neutrality
toward private sales of housing. 154 The right to discriminate had
become "embodied in the State's basic charter." That right was
approved, even though not ordered by a specific state actor-the
causal connection demanded by Justice Rehnquist in Jackson and
Flagg Brothers.
The potential meaning of liberty as. a greater limit on public
power than causal consequences of specific actors' decisions, therefore, expands the responsibility of private actors. One need only
examine the reasoning of state courts in cases overruled by the majority of the Supreme Court to discover the focus on interpretative
image. In Shelley, for example, the Missouri Supreme Court
stated:
154. The California court could very reasonably conclude that § 26 would and did

have wider impact than a mere repeal of existing statutes. Section 26 mentioned
neither the Unruh nor Rumford Act in so many words. Instead, it announced the
constitutional right of any person to decline to sell or lease his real property to

anyone to whom he did not desire to sell or lease. Unruh and Rumford were
thereby pro tanto repealed. But the section struck more deeply and more widely.
Private discriminations in housing were now not only free from Rumford and
Unruh but they also enjoyed a far different status than was true before the pas-

sage of those statutes. The right to discriminate, including the right to discriminate on racial grounds, was now embodied in the State's basic charter, immune
from legislative, executive, or judicial regulation at any level of the state government. Those practicing racial discriminations need no longer rely solely on their

personal choice. They could now invoke express constitutional authority, free
from censure or interference of any kind from official sources. All individuals,
partnerships, corporations and other legal entities, as well as their agents and

representatives, could now discriminate with respect to their residential real
property, which is defined as any interest in real property of any kind or quality,
"irrespective of how obtained or financed," and seemingly irrespective of the relationship of the State to such interests in real property.
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376-77 (1967).
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Agreements restricting property from being transferred to
or occupied by negroes have been consistently upheld by the
courts of this state as one which the parties have a right to make
and which is not contrary to public policy.155

The Michigan Supreme Court, in Sipes v. McGhee, described public policy as:
that general and well-settled public opinion relating to man's
plain, palpable duty to his fellow men, having due regard to all

the circumstances of each particular relation and situation.
"Sometimes such public policy is declared by Constitution;
sometimes by statute; sometimes by judicial decision. More
often, however, it abides only in the customs and conventions of
the people - in their clear consciousness and conviction of what

is naturally and inherently just and right between man and
man....

In Parmalee v. Morris,

. .

. it was held that a restrictive

covenant similar to the one now under consideration was not
void as against public policy."'

If the covenant's enforcement depended on state policy, rather
than simply the desires of private parties seeking a neutral court
enforcement of their prior contract, the integrity of legal meaning
in the act of enforcement, and not the act itself, connected fourteenth amendment guarantees to the covenantor. This connection
depends on an image of state action that defines public responsibility by the particular way in which the state provides legitimacy
to the exercise of private power.

This argument not only reveals Justice Rehnquist's abuses of
stare decisis in service of his own ideology,1 57 but also blocks future
155. Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d 679, 682 (1980).
Nor can it be claimed that the enforcement of such a restriction by court process
amounts to action by the state itself in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which relates to a state action exclusively. To sustain such a claim would be to
deny the parties to such an agreement one of the fundamental privileges of citizenship, access to the courts.
Id. at 683.
156. Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 624-25, 25 N.W.2d 638, 642-43 (1947)(quoting
Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Kinney, 95 Ohio St. 64, 115 N.E. 505, 507 (1916).
157. In footnote 11 of Flagg Brothers, Justice Rehnquist mischaracterizes Shelley to fit
his image of the "public." There he suggests that an affirmative court order is distinct from
a common law judge's refusal to prevent self-help for commercial breach of contract; action
versus inaction; Shelley versus Rizzo. First, such a comparison is dubiously relevant in light
of the U.C.C.'s significance in Flagg Brothers. Second, Rehnquist's argument was rejected in
Shelley as irrelevant to State responsibility. See supra text accompanying note 151. Third,
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attempts to transform an essentially unexamined and disruptive
(because inaccurate) apology for reinforcing present divisions of
social power.
The appeal to law as an expression of legitimacy is always a
circular argument.s' Yet that recognition need not suggest the rejection of law any more than an appeal to any other structure of
meaning as a form of social relationship. 5 9 Shelley and Reitman
assume a predictable public-private distinction in constitutional
structure, given the doctrines of their genesis. 160 A more adequate
understanding of their underlying perception of human liberty
might lead to a choice of different labels and language. A more
powerful criticism would seek a new method of producing social
meaning by denying the possible separation of reality or social life
from a mechanism of explanation and legitimation. At this juncture in history, that method would seem to require a measured
tension much like simultaneous attraction-repulsion rather than an
opposition of personal and public wills. This new conceptual methodology would create a perpetual struggle against itself in order to
preserve true material choices for social groups because no particular image of self and, therefore, of society, would prevent conceptualization of alternative methods.
V.

CONCLUSION: DYING TRUTH

Image construction is not the only technique by which individual politics are translated into adjudication or law. It is, however,
an essential element of authoritative adjudication because it defines legal meaning, distinguishing that meaning from common usage. This function is especially important given the subjectivity of
all knowledge in this period of history, for the legal decision must
be rational to be legitimate. To be rational, the meaning of a legal
act must be clear in its construction. Such construction imposed on
the argument is ultimately the same as the dissent's in Reitman: repeal of open housing is
inaction toward the remaining tenants permitted to reside there at the discretion of the
private seller.
158. See Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW
18 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
159. We cannot commit ourselves -to a particular value without committing ourselves to the form of social life that gives this value its specific meaning and to
the conditions that enable this form of life to emerge or develop in conformity to
the ideal that defines it. This is a thesis about the character of normative ideas.
Unger, supra note 3, at 652.
160. The image of public responsibility suggested here would go somewhat further than
Shelley and would overrule Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
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real life-better yet, legal life imposed on its object-must necessarily truncate discussion and investigations of alternative dispute
resolution in the object contest. As Llewellyn recognized, that is
part of the mechanism of social control-"to bind tomorrow by

today. "161
A pragmatist's exploration of "incoherences at the level of social or political theory" must be for purposes of reconstruction,
and not simply to demystify or deconstruct; because the only relevant epistemological question is who masters the consequences of
the inescapable meaning of experiences. Llewellyn is quite clear in
A Realistic Jurisprudence-theNext Step:
To affirm this is to confess no Hegelian mysticism of the State.
It leaves quite open any question of the existence of some "life
principle" in a society. It merely notes that, lacking such a selfsanation in terms of the whole, the whole would not indefinitely
continue as a whole. And to deny that would be folly. It would
be to carry emancipation from the idle ideology of "representation of the whole" into blindness to the half-truth around which
that once-precious ideology was built. But to deny the emancipation, to worship the half truth without dire and specific concern for the details of the welter, would be a folly quite as
great.'62
There is value, to be sure, in identifying "social conceptualism
[which] evolves into a modified formalism by transforming abstract
social and political ideas into determinate principles from which
judicial decisions are then derived."'163 Such identification demonstrates the limited and purposefully misleading character of such
discourse. But the realist-pragmatist cannot end with such unmasking, and neither should any form of criticism.
Reconstruction is not an option of deconstruction or demystification. For the realists, they are simply forms of the same enterprise. More importantly the present Supreme Court recognizes this
stake and would be only too happy to be held accountable to the
161. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1.
162. Realistic Jurisprudence,supra note 2, at 461-62. Compare Llewellyn to Unger:
[Elvery branch of doctrine must rely tacitly if not explicitly upon some picture
of the forms of human association that are right and realistic in the areas of
social life with which it deals. If, for example, you are a constitutional lawyer,

you need a theory of the democratic republic that would describe the proper
relation between state and society or the essential features of social organization
and individual entitlement that government must protect come what may.
Unger, supra note 3, at 570.
163. Bramble Bush Comment, supra note 5, at 1678 n.62.
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rather minor irritants of names and brickbats.1"
Reasoning of any kind implies a politics of image construction
that incorporates the natural, taken as human. Although, therefore, true escape may require historical change in order to permit
concepts of natural, and not merely speculative, alternatives to a
given social organization, 1 5 our consciousness of the process of
change still requires recognition of what we take as true. Hence,
legal relations as a form of present social life contain the inevitable
politics of any understanding of the world external to the self.
The issue, therefore, is not the conservatism of legal meaning,
or even the Conservatism of the meaning's manipulation. The issue
to be addressed is the inevitable social construction of meaning;
particularly the definition of society, and thereby knowledge. Some
such construction of what to stand for, if not inevitable in logic,
seems indispensible in civilized fact. As social meaning is more encompassing than law, it is potentially deserving of more than the
disregard a Supreme Court and critics choose to pay it. For there is
danger in such disregard: our society will make itself, and once it
has done so, no one who follows can do more than move on from
what we have left.

164. Casebeer, supra note 41.

165. See generally R.

UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS,

16-18, 196-97 (1975).

